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     In the context of globalization, the media plays a significant role in constructing perceptions of 
another culture. When constantly expanding understanding of different societies, misperceptions 
of another culture may also emerge. This is especially true for the current Sino – U.S. relations, as 
mistrust has been found from both countries in the recent poll. At the time of discouragement and 
pessimism, Xi Jinping, China’s president and the chairman of China’s Central Military, arrived in 
Washington on September 22nd, 2015 and started his first official state visit in the U.S. This study 
examined media coverage of President Xi’s first state visit in order to explore the power dynamics 
of ideology, politics, and culture between China and the U.S. Conducting comparative media 
research between U.S. and China breaks through the traditional UK and U.S. basis of 
communication study, which allowed communication scholars to be aware of non-western 
journalistic practices and be more sensitive to the global context.  
     A quantitative content analysis with a qualitative assessment of overall frames were used to 
identify the way The New York Times and the People’s Daily framed President Xi’s first state visit. 
Results showed that both The New York Times and the People’s Daily chose to highlight and 
interpret certain aspects of the trip, which led to different general assessments for the visit. There 
were five frames identified in their coverage, namely the anti-China frame, provocateur frame, 
recognition frame, great-leader frame and description frame. In addition, the distribution of quoted 
sources and issue salience were also found to be different in reports of The New York Times and 
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the People’s Daily. Possible ideological, cultural and political forces were elaborated upon in order 
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     On the 22nd September, 2015, the President of China and chairman of China’s Central Military, 
Xi Jinping, arrived in the United States. Whilst he had previously visited the U.S. six times, this 
was his first official state visit as the general secretary of the Communist Party and the President 
of China. The past three decades have witnessed frequent exchanges of high-level visits between 
U.S. and Chinese officials, and growing cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, culture and 
education, which has achieved positive results. A timeline of major events occurring between Sino-
American relations since the 1970s can be found in Appendix A. The trip surely became another 
major milestone in the collaboration between the two nations (Xinhua News Agency, 2015). China 
is the largest developing country and the United States the largest developed economy. The 
relationship between the two countries is not only implied in the bilateral context, it also greatly 
impacts the international community. George Soros (2015) claimed it would be beneficial for both 
countries – and, indeed, the whole world – if China and the U.S. were to work together rather than 
entering confrontation and conflict. Therefore, building a partnership between the two countries 
was the main purpose of the visit. On the 25th September, President Xi had a three-hour talk with 
President Obama in the White House. On the following day, The New York Times published an 
article titled “Obama and Xi Jinping of China Agree to Steps on Cyber Theft”, delineating that  
“the two nations remain deeply at odds on key issues…The exchange underscored the degree to 
which Mr. Xi has in many ways confounded Mr. Obama’s hopes and expectations…In another 
point of friction, Mr. Obama said he had deep concerns over human rights in China, describing 
what sounded like a lecture he had given to Mr. Xi about the issue” (Davis & Sanger, 2015). Two 
days later, the People’s Daily (Yao, 2015) described the same event, but from a quite different 
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perspective: “A total of 49 achievements were made during Xi and his US counterpart Barack 
Obama's summit on Friday in the White House …covering a wide range of issues regarding 
investment, people-to-people exchanges, climate change and coordination and cooperation in 
multilateral affairs”. It can clearly be seen that the same meeting received almost conflicted 
versions of coverage and this was not an exception. In almost all aspects of President Xi’s trip, 
Chinese and American journalists provided distinct interpretations in their reports. This media 
phenomenon provided the inspiration behind this research, which aims to investigate how media 
professionals can frame the same story differently, as well as analyzing what the driving force is 
behind this. 
   
Purpose  
This state visit is considered a type of “media event” (Dayan & Katz, 1992), which is an event 
phased at an international stage for the global media to make their own cultural interpretations. 
This was a critical event that demands examination of media discourse. Additionally, the 
presidential summit is not only a face-to-face meeting between political leaders, but also “a form 
of symbolic communication that conveys a sense of great authority, power, and legitimacy of 
leaders in the diplomatic arena” (Chang, 2003, p.119). In the context of globalization, the image 
of a national leader in the media is an influential component for intercultural communication. Xing 
Lu (2011) describes the role of a nation’s political actors as a “cultural broker”, who promotes 
positive interaction and reduces or eliminates unnecessary conflict in an intercultural context 
through their rhetorical deliberations and actions.  
Extensive literature has already proven that the media plays a significant role in constructing 
perceptions of other cultures (Bennett, 1997; Feldman, 2007; Lewis & Reese, 2009). During the 
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process of constant expansion in our understanding of different societies, misperceptions of other 
cultures have also emerged. This is especially true for current Sino–U.S. relations. Based on recent 
poll results (Friedhoff & Smeltz, 2015), Americans attach high value to bilateral relations overall: 
“88 percent define the U.S.-Sino relations as important and more than 50 percent saying that U.S.-
China relations are very important” (p.1). It is worthwhile to note that Americans tend to indicate 
their mistrust toward China: “Just 34 percent think China will deal responsibly with problems 
facing the world, and 56 percent state China plays a negative role in resolving the key problems” 
(p.2). Similar results were also found from the Chinese public’s perspective that only 45 percent 
of respondents trust that the United States would handle international issues responsibly. The 
mistrust exhibited from both sides can be highly detrimental. Schell (2015) once commented that 
in 2015, the level of discouragement and pessimism between China and U.S. reached its highest 
point since the 1989 Tiananmen protests. This highlights the importance of investigating how 
media practitioners from each country attach certain meanings to President Xi’s first state visit 
during this special time. The mistrust exhibited from both sides can be highly detrimental. Schell 
(2015) once commented that in 2015, the level of discouragement and pessimism between China 
and U.S. reached its highest point since the 1989 Tiananmen protests. This highlights the 
importance of investigating how media practitioners from each country attach certain meanings to 
President Xi’s first state visit during this special time. Hänggli (2011) once expressed his concern 
that media scholars have not paid enough attention to factors that could potentially influence media 
frames. By mainly concentrating on how framing effects public opinion (Hänggli, 2011), the 
question of how a specific frame originates has been largely ignored. Because this has been widely 
neglected, the current study intends to emphasize frame-building and the key factors that cause an 
impact in the process.  
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     Informed by Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) theory of five forces shaping journalistic 
practices (social system, social institution, organization, routines and individuals), this paper will 
use coverage of President Xi’s visit as a case to explore how media in China and the U.S. framed 
the same media event differently as well as exploring the relevant cultural, political and 
ideological factors contributing to it. There are two reasons this paper places emphasis on 
societal forces of news framing. Firstly, these factors have been largely ignored or taken for 
granted by journalists, as social forces are too complex to comprehend and have become 
naturalized and hegemonic in day-to-day journalistic works. In addition, Shoemaker (1991) 
indicates the importance of examining societal forces in journalistic practices, suggesting 
influences such as the dominant ideology within a society could exert more of an effect on media 
frames than individual and institutional factors. This study categorizes factors building media 
frames into three macro groups: culture, politics (elite and interest group) and ideology. Since 
China and the U.S. feature truly different social, economic and political structures, a cross-
national comparative analysis would be helpful in exploring media coverage patterns of 
international affair issues as well as deepening the understanding of power dynamics between 
China and the U.S. Furthermore, conducting comparative media research between the U.S. and 
China breaks through the traditional UK and U.S. version of communication study, which allows 
scholars to be aware of non-Western journalistic practices and be more sensitive to the global 
context. Such comparative analysis is beneficial to examine media phenomena more 
comprehensively and systematically. 
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    In this chapter, theories, concepts and relevant previous studies are reviewed to explain the 
importance of studying news frames, and to identify the elements that may have influence on it 
and the different journalistic cultures that persist in U.S. and China. The review includes two 
sections: the first section of framing, with regards to framing theory, Hofstede’s cultural dimension 
theory, and how the U.S. media frames China and how the Chinese media frames the U.S. in the 
existing literature. The second section mainly addresses journalistic socialization in the newsroom 
and how different journalism cultures are identified in the U.S. and China.  
 
Framing  
What is framing? 
     Framing is one of the most essential theoretical frameworks to analyze news content. The origin 
of the frame metaphor lies in anthropology and sociology. In anthropologist Bateson’s (1972) 
words, “A frame is a spatial and temporal bonding of a set of interactive messages” (p. 191). 
Sociologist Goffman (1974) is considered as the intellectual father of framing theory and defined 
primary frameworks in that “When the individual in our Western society recognizes a particular 
event, he tends, whatever else he does, to imply in this response (and in effect employ) one or more 
frameworks or schemata of interpretation of a kind that can be called primary” (p.21). Goffman 
(1974) proposes that primary frameworks vary in degree of organization: some primary 
frameworks are “neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates, and rules” (p.21), whilst 
other primary frameworks may not have a clear and tangible shape but may only suggest a way of 
understanding and interpretation. These various shapes of primary frameworks (Goffman, 1974) 
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serve the purpose of allowing users to “locate, perceived, identify, and label a seemingly infinite 
number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (p.21). After Goffman published his study in 
1974, communication scholars promptly embraced his concept of primary frameworks.  
Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980) were two of the earliest scholars to introduce framing to 
communication and media research. Under Tuchman’s (1978) understanding, frames are useful 
tools that journalists adapt in order to deal with constantly changing information. Tuchman 
claimed that news is a window of the world and is socially constructed, functioning as a social 
resource: “Through its frame, Americans learn of themselves and others, of their institutions, 
leaders, and life styles, and those of other nations and their peoples” (Tuchman, 1978, p.1). Two 
years later, Gitlin (1980) proposed a more commonly cited definition, which perceived frames as 
“principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what 
exists, what happens and what matters” (p.6). He agreed with Tuchman that media frames are 
socially constructed tools that help people make sense of the world. In his words, “What makes 
the world beyond direct experience look natural is a media frame (p.6).” He also thought that it 
was impossible for journalists to avoid certain frames, since journalism needed those frames to 
organize and regulate their production. Gitlin (1980) suggests when scholars attempted to analyze 
media content they should ask, “What is the frame here? Why this frame and not another? What 
patterns are shared by the frames clamped over this event and the frames clamped over that one, 
by frames in different media in differ nt places at different moments?” (p. 7) 
Following those presented by Tuchman and Gitlin, there have been several definitions 
suggested to refine the concept of frames. Tankard (1991) claimed, “A frame is a central 
organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the 
use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (p.11). In 1993, Entman demonstrated that 
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framing was defined loosely in communication studies due to a lack of conclusive definition and 
the scattered conceptualization in the ideal of framing. This situation demanded that scholars gain 
a more precise and universal understanding of key terms in framing. Beyond that, Entman (1993) 
still confirmed the power of communication text, stating: “To frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (p.52). In terms of the approach for operationalizing 
frames, Entman (1993) believed that small units constituted news frames. According to 
Entman(1993), news frames can be analyzed and found through “the presence or absence of certain 
keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide 
thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (p.52).  
From the perspective of news production, Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) conceptualized 
framing as “the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines 
and constructs a political issue or public controversy” (p. 567). More recently, Reese, Gandy and 
Grant (2001) synthesized concepts that had been previously used and proposed their own working 
definition of frames, which is concerned with interests, communicators, verbal and visual symbolic 
resources and culture in the communication process to understand the world. In their words, 
“Frames are organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work 
symbolically and meaningfully structure the social world” (Reese, Gandy & Grant, 2001, p.11). In 
this research, the term “frames” refers to the meanings journalists and editors tend to give an issue, 
which may come in the form of “media packages”, which are defined by Gamson and Modigliani 
(1989): “media discourse can be conceived of as a set of interpretive packages that give meaning 
to an issue. A package has an internal structure. At its core is a central organizing idea, or frame, 
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for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue” (p.3). For them, the media frame 
is central to organizing ideas and plotting lines whilst providing meaning to an event. The 
researchers state: “The frame suggests what the controversy is about the essence of the issue” 
(p.11). By virtually emphasizing certain elements of an issue above others, the frame provides 
users with a way to understand a topic or event. They also identified five components in the 
package and serve as a device to accommodate information: (1) metaphors, (2) exemplars (i.e., 
historical examples from which lessons are drawn), (3) catch-phrases, (4) depiction, and (5) visual 
images (e.g., icons).     
 
Factors influencing frame-building  
Framing has been introduced in communication studies in two ways (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 
2009). Firstly, it can be understood as a dependent variable, which intends to explore how 
frameworks are socially constructed and how different frames compete for adoption through 
societal and media discourse. The second approach considers frames as an independent variable, 
which attempts to understand how a specific primary framework influences the audience’s beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviours. The former type is mainly concerned with “framing building” and the 
latter one is essentially dealing with “frame setting” or “framing effects”. Fung and Scheufele 
(2014) clarify, “Framing building refers to the process of how news is being selected and 
produced… Framing-setting refers to the process of how the media transfers from media outlets 
to audience, i.e. the process of how the media frame influences individual interpretive schema for 
processing” (p.136). The emphasis of this study is only on frame building. In other words, the 
frames referred in this study allow us to explore how different elements impact the coverage of a 
certain issue or an event.  
9 
     Prior research in framing building includes research that examined extraneous and internal 
elements having effect on the process of news production and selection. (Tuchman, 1978; 
Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Sheafer, 2001). Tuchman’s (1978) study on news as a socially 
constructed reality has been one of the most cited studies measuring media frames as dependent 
variable. Tuchman’s research provides some support for the assumption that a news story is the 
production of journalists’ social and professional routines. That is to say, the structure of media 
institution and work routines of media professionals can impact the way in which stories are told 
and framed. The hierarchy of influences model, proposed by Shoemaker and Reese (1996), 
explains how the following five media determinants influence news content from the micro to 
macro level: journalists, media routines, organization, pressure from interest groups, and ideology. 
In 2014, they completely revised the forces that mediate in the process of media message creation. 
Due to the unprecedented technical transformation and rapid globalization of the media world and 
broader society over the 21st century, the researchers adopted a more international perspective in 
order to explore how the particular construction, production and control of specific patterns of 
interpretation are embedded into media content. On the basis of original editions of Mediating the 
Massage, Shoemaker and Reese (2014) identified five levels of influence and organized them from 
the macro social system down to the micro individual level, as follows: social system (formerly 
ideology); social institution (earlier categorized as an extra media level); organization; routines; 
and individuals. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) thought the social system to be the most 
comprehensive, complex and broad level of influence. It can be understood as an aggregation of 
subsystems, incorporating ideological, economic, political, cultural and mass communication 
institutions. The social system of a particular society, as a macro-level influence, sets the 
foundation upon which influences from other level reside. The attributes of the social system 
10 
determine the interrelationships among social institutions, the composite of media organizations, 
the particular pattern of routines applied, and the values individuals believe in.  
However, Shoemaker and Reese (2014) did not regard the social system level as superior or 
dominant over other levels of analysis, because they considered that transmitting information to 
audiences about an event is a complicated process. Although the concept of the social system of 
influence is compelling, it is not powerful in a uniform manner in every case. The researchers 
suggested that media scholars should pay more attention to this level of analysis, stating that the 
“social system can be difficult to fully comprehend, especially to the extent that they have become 
naturalized and hegemonic. They may become taken for granted and the society difficult to 
imagine they to be absent or significantly changed; the researcher must take a step back with a 
critical distance, while being mindful of the larger web of global connections” (p.94).  
The second-level of influences that could possibly affect media content comes from social 
institutions, which focus on how media organizations interact with other power centres in society. 
This can be understood as pressure and constraints from political elites, interest groups, advertisers 
and audience. Since journalists rely heavily on a variety of media sources to gather information, 
they can exert influence over media content and create news frames that conform to their own 
interests. The third level of influence refers to broader institutional imperatives within media 
organizations, which would normally require news content to remain in accordance with its 
ownership of the organization, policies, goals, action rules, bureaucratic structure and economic 
viability. Those crucial benchmarks of a media organization, in one way, demonstrate how an 
organization allocates its finite resources and how it attempts to achieve its organizational goal.                                               
Shoemaker and Reese (2014) define routines: “As individuals in groups, journalists have 
developed styles of thought from an endless pattern of norms in response to common situations… 
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those patterned repeated practice, forms and rules that media workers use to do their jobs” (p.203). 
They see most of these rules as unwritten and argue that they have an enormous impact on the 
symbolic creation process, because journalists use routines as guidance to accomplish their work. 
In their opinion, there are three main sources of routine: audiences, organizations and suppliers of 
content. These sources strongly influence how the media make decisions, how stories are framed, 
and how content is written.  
The last level of influence comes from individuals: specifically, how individual characteristics 
(personal demographic features, backgrounds, roles and experience related to the professional 
context of the communicator, the work position of the communicator within an organization, etc.) 
affect the news creation process. Edelman (1993) believed that ideology and interests groups exert 
their influence in the selection of a particular news frame. Sheafer (2001) demonstrated in the 
political communication arena that there are two categories of values that may potentially influence 
how journalists frame a particular issue: political-ultural values and the media’s professional 
values. In terms of the first category, a particular issue is estimated based on its political-cultural 
values, the importance of issues, events and actors. Sheafer (2001) thought these values originated 
in the ideological system, which represents the symbolic centre and consensus of a nation. In 
Sheafer’s (2001) words, “The closer an issue, event, media frame, or political actor is deemed to 
be to this consensus, the more important it is considered, and the better chance it has receiving 
media attention” (p.712). With regards to the second category — media’s professional values and 
needs - Sheafer (2001) explains that this is comprised of the needs of media organizations (media 
routines) and the stress of advertisers.  
Hänggli (2011) has demonstrated his concern that media scholars are not paying enough 
attention to factors that could potentially influence media frames. Most researchers have focused 
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on the production and selection of news in general (e.g., Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979; Shoemaker 
& Reese, 2014), rather than focusing on framing in particular. By primarily concentrating on the 
effects of framing on public opinion (Hänggli, 2011), the question of how a specific frame 
originates has been largely ignored. Because this topic has been widely neglected, the current study 
focuses on frame-building and the key factors that enforce impact during the process. As 
Shoemaker (1991) indicated, societal forces, such as a dominant ideology within a society, can 
exert more impact on media practice than individual factors (professionalism, ethnic background, 
etc.) and institutional characteristics. This study placed greater emphasis on societal factors. 
Factors influencing frame-building and the way journalists frame a given issue are categorized into 
three groups: culture, politics (elite and interest group) and ideology. 
 
     Culture     When Goffman (1974) introduced the concept of frame in sociology, he wrote about 
the implicit cultural root that the meaning of a frame might possess. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) 
emphasized that culture is an important subsystem within the greater social system and that it 
shares a symbiotic relationship with the media. The communication process is fundamental in the 
elaboration of culture, since the media integrate the pattern of symbolic meaning into content, thus 
influencing how people understand themselves and the world around them. Prior research informs 
us that the news world is highly framed, that news is not presented to readers in a raw manner, and 
that reported events are pre-organized (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes & Sasson, 1992). Culture, as an 
important factor, is embedded in the framing process itself. In 1993, Entman posited that frames 
could be encountered in at least four locations in the communication process: the communicator, 
the media content, the receiver, and culture. Entman (1993) defined culture as a “stock of 
commonly invoked frames” (p.53). Culture, then, in an empirical sense, is a demonstrable set of 
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frames, which is frequently visible in the public discourse and represents the values of most people 
within one social group.  
     As cultural storytellers, journalists apply and amplify cultural phenomena (beliefs, values, 
norms shared, collective memory, etc.) in media content and convey them to audiences 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). This argument re-confirms the role of culture, serving as a 
constituent element in framing, as suggested by Gamson and Modigliani (1989). Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989) described how the hegemony and media use specific packaging to characterize 
the nuclear power issue. They defined a frame package as “a cluster of logical organized devices 
that function as an identity kit for a frame” (p.3) and that its production process was influenced 
by three broad classes of determinants: culture resonance, sponsor activities and media practice. 
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) believed that by constructing the news message in a manner that 
causes many elements to refer to a frame, journalists are able to encase cultural phenomena in 
media content and facilitate certain interpretation within society. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) 
explained: “Certain packages have a natural advantage because their ideas and language resonate 
with larger cultural themes. Resonance increases the appeal of a package; they make it appear 
natural and familiar. Those who respond to the larger cultural theme will find it easier to respond 
to a package with the same sonorities” (p.5). Therefore, cultural resonance could be understood 
as the context dependency of frames.  
     In order to further develop Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) study, Entman (2004) utilized 
cultural congruence as an important variable in the cascading model. He proposed the use of a 
cascading activation model based on his findings of White House framing after the terrorist attack 
of September 11, 2001. In the study, Entman recognized that cultural resonance could be 
considered a criterion to measure the capacity of news, as well as a stimulant in promoting a 
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particular perception targeted towards audiences. He suggested that there was a positive 
predictive relationship between cultural resonance and the potential influence of news, noting 
that the more the words or images were used in media content, the more they were noticeable 
and salient in culture, and the more likely they were to create framing that provoked similar 
feelings and ideas in the majority of audiences. In addition to measuring the effect of news, 
cultural congruence serves as an essential variable in the cascading model. The cascading model 
(Entman, 2004) was created to explain “how thoroughly the thoughts and feelings that support a 
frame extend down from the White House through the rest of the system--and who thus wins the 
framing contest and gains the upper hand politically” (p. 419). Cultural congruence is a 
measurement of the complexity in how a news frame can descend through different stages of 
framing and evoke similar reactions at each level, based upon the assumption that there is no 
difference between the other three variables (motivations, power and strategy). The more 
congruent the frame with schemas that prevail in the political culture, the more likely it will 
succeed in stimulating the desired reception along the different steps.  
More recently, Van Gorp (2007) attempted to emphasize the role of implicit culture in a 
frame by suggesting that culture is an integral part of framing. He demonstrated that there is an 
abundant “cultural stock of frames” available for communication. On one hand, these cultural 
resources facilitated the formation of particular media frames. On the other hand, however, the 
receivers must all possess commonly shared cultural experiences to process the communication 
attempted achieved by media practitioners. Therefore, understanding the cultural phenomena as 
a component of media frames is fundamental in framing analysis. In order to better compare 
culture between the U.S. and China, and to explore how different cultures exert impacts on news 
frames, Hofstede’s cultural dimension framework is applied in this study.  
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      The cultural dimension theory of Dutch management researcher Geert Hofstede is one of the 
most significant frameworks for cross-cultural communication in existence today. Hofstede 
developed his original model as a result of factor analysis, by examining the results of two separate 
global surveys carried out with IBM employees from 1968 to 1969 and 1971 to 1973. This theory 
quantified cultural values and used them to explain the observed dissimilarities in different cultures. 
Analysis of the original theory proposed the four further dimensions of cultural values: power 
distance, individualism versus collectivism, femininity versus masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance. In 1992, an independent study in Hong Kong – conducted by Hofstede and Bond – 
identified a fifth dimension: long-term orientation versus short-term orientation. In 2010, a sixth 
dimension was also added to the model – indulgence versus restraint – which was based on 
Minkov's analysis of data from the World Values Survey. The cultural dimension this study 
focuses on is Power Distance. This dimension measures “the extent to which the less powerful 
members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 2010, p.45).  
Members of high-power cultures perceive power to be a normalized and natural component 
of society. In contrast, in low-power cultures, individuals believe that power should be exerted 
only for the purpose of effecting legitimate interests. China sits in the higher score on this 
dimension, which means citizens largely believe that inequalities in power distribution are 
acceptable. The subordinate-superior relationship tends to be polarized, and there is no defence 
against power abuse by superiors. Generally speaking, individuals within such cultural 
environments are optimistic about people’s capacity for leadership and initiative.  
On the other hand, America scores low on this dimension, which can be linked to the American 
principle of “liberty and justice for all.” This is evidenced by an explicit emphasis on equal rights 
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in all aspects of American society and government. According to Hanusch (2009), cultural values 
have been conspicuous in relation to journalistic practice. He emphasized the culture differences 
that exist between Asian and Western countries, arguing that they strongly influence how societies 
practice journalism. Hanusch (2009) notes: “Asian values such as respect for authority (power 
distance) and an emphasis on benefit to the community rather than the individual (collectivism) 
were supposed to lead a new type of journalism, different from that of the West” (p.617). 
 
     Politics (elites and interest group)     The second determinant that influences the production 
and selection of news is politics, specifically the sponsorship from political elites and interest 
group.  Gamson and Modigliani (1989) demonstrated hat “Packages frequently have sponsors, 
interested in promoting their careers. Sponsorship is more than merely advocacy, involving such 
tangible activities as speech making, interviews with journalists, advertising, article and pamphlet 
writing, and the filling of legal briefs to promote a preferred package” (p.6). These sponsors of a 
specific package usually work to promote some collective agenda rather than their personal ones. 
Their study of nuclear power highlighted important sponsors including public officials (their 
efforts on developing awareness on energy awareness), social movement organizations (actively 
engaged in mobilizing potential constituents and demobilizing antagonists), environmental groups, 
consumer protection groups and professional groups.  
     Scheufele (1999) suggested that frame sponsors or elite groups represent one of a number of 
potential factors that have an important effect on frame building, because journalists usually count 
on press releases and government statements to cover a particular issue. Those materials normally 
come from interest groups, state bureaucracies and other political actors or corporations, which 
might attempt to strategically prompt the media to adopt frames in accordance with their interests. 
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Empirical evidence has verified that political and corporate actors consistently engage in frame 
building in mass media (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). The reason that these interest groups 
concern with media frames is their intention to direct public perception and interpretation of an 
issue. Therefore, exerting influence on how journalists cover a story becomes an option.  
     In fact, it is not only political elites and interest group that would like to make their presence 
known in the process of news production – journalists demand the same. Shoemaker and Reese 
(2014) stated that sources do not have an equal likelihood of being contacted by journalists. Those 
with more economic and political strength have more opportunities to influence news content than 
their counterparts with less power. Additionally, the availability of these organizations makes it 
much easier for journalists to use information than it would be through individuals alone. Since 
organizations usually have regular office hours and full-time staff to assist journalists in accessing 
certain information, individuals can usually only be reached for a short and unfixed amount of 
time, daily (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Moreover, journalists’ preferences for official sources are 
not merely because of their easier accessibility, but also because media practitioners have the 
mentality that government officials and police are more likely to have important things to express 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). In terms of the intervention of an interest group, Shoemaker and 
Reese (2014) propose that interest groups often attempt to communicate their stance on one or 
more issues to the public via the media – either by providing “guide-lines” for covering specific 
topics (e.g. The 1968 “fair trial-free press” guidelines of the American Bar Association, which 
were adopted by 23 states by 1976 and influenced how the media cover crime and court stories) 
or by persuading the mass media on the first group’s behalf when the interest group intends to 
lobby in response to certain legislation. 
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     Ideology     Ideology is considered the third influence on frame-building. The definition of 
ideology (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014) adopted in this study is: “a symbolic mechanism that serves 
as a cohesive and integrating force in society” (p.212). The researchers concluded the fundamental 
ideological value in the United States is a “capitalist economic system, private ownership pursuit 
of profit by self-interested entrepreneurs, and free markets…The companion [political values 
center around liberal democracy, a system in which all people are presumed to have equal worth 
and a right to share in their own governance, making decisions based on rational self-interest” 
(p.213). They also believe these values have prevailed and are maintained throughout the U.S. 
media. In addition, the ideological influence Shoemaker and Reese (2014) referred to represents a 
social level or a total structure, rather than an individual’s belief system. They situated the 
ideological subsystem in the most macro level – the social system of their hierarchy of influences 
model.  
     Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) adopted ideology and framing theory to examine how 
U.S. and Chinese newspapers covered the Fourth United Nations Conference on Women and Non-
Governmental Organizations Forum in Beijing in 1995. They identified three categories of 
ideology able to exert primary forces on news frames: dominant ideology, elite ideology, and 
journalistic ideology or occupational ideology. Dominant ideology can be conceptualized as 
beliefs and perceptions commonly shared by the most of people within a particular society 
(Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998). They agreed with Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) idea that 
capitalism is the sustained dominant ideology in U.S., but they also suggested anticommunism as 
another accurate example of dominant ideology in America. In contrast, Chinese society is 
characterized by communism as the dominant ideology. Secondly, elite ideology is defined as “the 
particular ideology or policy orientation on the part of the government or the administration in 
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power at any given point in time” (p.134). Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) stated that elite 
ideology is in accordance with the dominant ideology in many cases. However, if policy makers’ 
interests deviate from the dominant ideology, the elite ideology seems to have more influence on 
framing in news than the dominant ideology, according to the two researchers. Thirdly, journalistic 
ideology or occupational ideology is essentially derived from media routines and occupational 
values. The researchers proposed several cases of U.S. journalistic ideology such as “emphasis on 
events, not issues; emphasis on the unusual and deviant; and focus on elite sources and actors” 
(p.134). In many cases, Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) thought the U.S. journalistic 
ideology to underlie the elite ideology in America “not only by being subject to manipulation by 
elites but also through keeping out access by, and trivialization of, other less powerful groups in 
society” (p.134). On the other hand, the journalistic ideology in China continuously and 
unconditionally supports the party’s dominant ideology, even though gradual alterations have 
occurred in the media system and changes to journalistic norms due to the introduction of the 
concept of “market” in the media sector. Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) described: “A 
strong issue orientation in reporting and an emphasis on ideological indoctrination of the masses 
continue to constitute primary examples of journalistic ideology in Ch a” (p.135). 
     To conclude, three broad levels of influence – culture, politics and ideology - may all be 
expected to exert primary forces on the frame-building process and impact on how journalists and 






How the U.S. and China have framed each other 
     Studies about how the U.S. media framed China and how its Chinese counterparts framed the 
U.S. have received substantial attention from communication scholars. Several studies have 
analyzed the frame packages and narratives that specific media have adopted. One primary finding 
is that all media coverage has attempted to emphasize a specific perspective to serve underlying 
national interest.  Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) concluded: “In general, newspaper 
coverage of China has reflected the dominant capitalistic ideology within the United States” 
(p.135). Kobland, Du, and Kwan (1992) investigated coverage of The New York Times regarding 
China’s 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy student movement and found that the media 
devoted some amount of space to emphasize problems and the collapse of the China Communist 
Party. The prevalent frame in U.S. coverage of China could be summarized as “anti-communism”, 
where China is considered as an ideological enemy. 
     In a comparative study conducted by Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998), the researchers 
investigated how the American press (The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street 
Journal, The Chicago Tribune, The Los Angeles Times and Atlanta Journal-Constitution) and 
Chinese press (China Daily) reported the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, 
held at the NGO Forum in Beijing in 1995 and hypothesized that ideological differences would 
primarily influence news frames. The overall findings supported this hypothesis. Specifically, the 
majority of U.S. news coverage tended to focus on criticisms of China rather than critical issues 
the Conference had hoped to raise awareness of. According to the researchers, “the strong 
influence of anticommunists ideology (i.e., the China frame) on the U.S. news about the 
Conference, reinforced by journalist’s propensity to cover conflict, is clearly reflected in the 
quantitative prominence given to criticizing China in the news coverage. These criticisms 
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constituted 34 percent of the theme coded under other topics. Qualitative analysis of the critical 
discourse against China revealed a clear underlying emphasis on the familiar themes of oppression 
and deceitfulness that have long been associated with the coverage of China as a communist 
country” (p.145). In contrast, Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) found that the media 
coverage of China Daily primarily devoted its discussions to critical issues around which the 
Conference attempted to raise global consciousness. Amongst the 3,219 units of analysis coded, 
1,484 (46 percent) clearly focused on the issues of concern within the Conference. Furthermore, 
U.S. coverage paid more attention to point that “the logistics of the platform had an overtone of 
conflict” (p.147), whereas its Chinese counterpart featured more news stories about the 
“cooperative efforts of delegates to reach agreements in the platform” (p.147). Akhavan-Majid and 
Ramaprasad (1998) stated that one of the most important forces involved in China Daily’s 
construction of a positive image of the Conference is the dominant communist ideology in the 
country and China’s elite ideology as the conference host.  
     In another study on the U.S.-China situation, Chang (2000) compared ABC television coverage 
of President Jiang Zemin’s 1997 visit to the United States with China Central Television’s (CCTV) 
account of President Clinton visiting China in 1998. For the summit in Washington, ABC’s overall 
storyline was to parallel past (e.g., violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-
democracy movement and Taiwan issue) with present events in the same context in order to create 
competing images during president Jiang’s visit. By doing so, Chinese leaders and the government 
were described as villains and abusers of human rights. In terms of rhetoric devices, ABC tended 
to be perspective and instructive: “China was problematic in its internal and external practices, 
behaved like a deviant case with therapeutic lessons to be learned, and had to follow the corrective 
path in order to join the community of nations. China was molded according to U.S. specifications 
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and satisfaction. Because Jiang came to visit, Washington served as the point of reference for 
Beijing to act” (Chang, 2000, p. 135). In comparison, CCTV sketched President Clinton’s visit to 
Beijing in a different light. In most CCTV reports, no historic events were mentioned from both 
sides. The main plot was focused on the present event and aimed to create consistent images rather 
than contradictions. CCTV adopted descriptive and demonstrative mannerisms as a rhetoric 
mechanism to frame the presidential event and positioned China as the center of global attention. 
In CCTV’s coverage, the Chinese government and leaders were portrayed as heroes and defenders 
of national interests and world peace. The representation of China was as a rising nation that 
deserved to be respected by the global community. However, the antagonistic coverage of China 
in the U.S. media would not invariably continue to be so. Actually, it evolved in line with the 
alteration of elite ideology. Chang (1988) demonstrates that when President Nixon visited China 
in the 1970s, The New York Times lessened the frequency with which it employed negative 
symbols (e.g., oppression and totalitarianism) to refer China and began to promote the 
normalization of Sino-U.S. relations. Lee (2002) adopted a constructionist approach of framing 
analysis to investigate ideological packages of The New York Times’ editorials and columns from 
1990 to 2002, and he identified three main ideological packages during this time: containment 
(conservative), engagement (centrist), and global integration. The frame of containment 
emphasized the use of trade privileges to punish China for its poor human rights record. The 
engagement frame started to devote greater discussion to attaching modest and achievable human 
rights conditions to trade. The frame of global integration suggested bringing China into 
international organizations. Moreover, enhancing American trade and China’s human rights 
remained significant as part of the ideological package. More recently, Li (2014) examined U.S. 
and Chinese newspaper coverage of the summit between President Xi and President Obama in 
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2013. His findings showed that American newspapers tended to emphasize economic issues and 
other controversial topics, such as cyber security, military conflict and human rights. In addition, 
the U.S. media were more inclined to directly confront particular issues that may lead to collision 
and dissension in Sino-U.S. relations. However, Chinese newspapers were more likely to sketch a 
grandiose image of the bilateral relations and use euphemistic and indirect terms to ease the tension 
and solve potential problems between China and the U.S.  
 
Chinese media – content analysis 
Besides knowing the differences that exist in media representations of “others” between the 
U.S. and China it is also important to inquire as to how the Chinese news media frame the Chinese 
government in their own coverage. Numerous studies have used content analysis to explore news 
frames of the Chinese government in different Chinese media, which could be seen as investigation 
into the largely shared and unquestionable belief Chinese journalists have about their ruling power. 
Although these studies relate to various topics, they indicate that the Chinese news media has 
constructed an enduring and consistent positive image of the Chinese government. In order to 
better understand media frames adopted by People’s Daily, this section reviewed media research 
employing content analysis and summarized some of the major research findings on Chinese media 
workers’ shared understanding of the Chinese government. 
Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established its authority in 1949, the communist 
ideology has prevailed and manifested in the operation of social systems in China over the last six 
decades. The influence of communist ideology in the media system is expected to provide a voice 
of support to CCP’s policies and decisions amongst the Chinese citizens (Zhao, 2000). Although 
the Chinese government had embraced the concept of “market” by the late 1970s, and had 
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implemented a series of media reform policies, the top priority for the news media is still to serve 
the interests of the CCP. Chan and Qiu (2002) described this as a “partially liberalized authoritarian 
media system”. Specifically, Chinese news agencies are not allowed to question the legitimacy 
and authority of the CCP: however, specific criticism related to a particular policies or government 
corruption may be seen frequently in media reports. Overall, coverage from Chinese news media 
is meant to advocate the leadership and performance of the CCP for the Chinese people, and many 
prior research studies have confirmed this. Luther and Zhou (2005) compared the coverage of the 
SARS epidemic in the U.S. and China. They found that Chinese newspapers were reluctant to 
describe the negative economic impact of the disease and blamed the Chinese government for the 
outbreak of SARS in China. Furthermore, Chinese newspapers were less likely to provide a 
conflict frame or associate conflicts with China. On the other hand, they gave extensive coverage 
to emphasize the positive actions that Chinese officials took to curtail any negative impacts of the 
disease. In another framing analysis, investigating coverage of HIV/AIDS, Tong (2006) compared 
the way in which The New York Times and China Daily framed the HIV/AIDS issue in China 
between 2001 and 2004. Her results showed that the dominant frame China Daily adopted was a 
public health issue, which was a frame focused highly on enforcing public education for prevention 
and self-protection from HIV/AIDS. In this frame, China Daily devoted a large chunk of coverage 
to the Chinese government’s commitment and efforts in dealing with the disease. Besides plainly 
portraying the positive role the Chinese government played in controlling the epidemic, China 
Daily also gave a lot of attention to the social care and charity issues that the Chinese government 
was involved in, in order to provide a favourable depiction. Another framing analysis of the AIDS 
issue in China was conducted by Wu (2006), who further explained how Chinese news media 
articulated the pro-government frame. In the study, Wu (2006) examined news coverage of 
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HIV/AIDS in China by the Xinhua News Agency in 2004 and compared with coverage from the 
Associated Press of the United States. Three dominant frames (i.e. the defense frame, the progress 
frame, and the ambivalence/ambiguity frame) have constituted the pro-government frame in 
Xinhua’s report. In the defense frame, Xinhua’s report underlined the increasingly open attitude of 
the Chinese government and the active engagement the government has engaged in for the 
prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS. Wu (2006) suggested there were two major reasons behind 
the constructed the positive portrayal of Chinese government in fighting HIV/AIDS in China. The 
majority of Xinhua’s report stressed official statements, political leaders’ speeches and established 
government agencies regarding the Chinese government and made every effort to address the 
issue. The subtler and more implicit way was to refer favourable comments from external sources 
on the leadership and performance of Chinese government to fight HIV/AIDS. The progress frame 
was built through vast coverage of the change that Chinese government and the whole society had 
been encountered in fighting the epidemic. With recognizing the existing problems in dealing with 
the issue, it focused on a better social environment for HIV/AIDS victims and a change in 
governmental attitude.  
In terms of the ambivalence/ambiguity frame, Xinhua’s report tended to be cautious about 
revealing the exact numbers regarding the extent of the disease. In particular, it preferred to 
construct the severity of HIV/AIDS theoretically rather than statistically. Of the two pro-
government frames, Xinhua’s report was able to frame the Chinese government as “committed to 
caring for its people, pragmatic and competent in its actions and open-minded to international 
cooperation” (Wu, 2006, p.268). In addition, the tendency of the Chinese media to put a positive 
spin on the CCP’s leadership can also be detected from other public affairs coverage. Yang (2014) 
intended to untangle how the Chinese media framed NGO’s social roles after the 2008 Wenchuan 
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earthquake. The results revealed that the party media recognized the social contribution made by 
the NGO after the natural disaster. At the same time, they tended to refer more to government 
sources and associated NGO’s activities with the CCP’s leaders. This type of self-legitimizing 
frame has also been found in coverage of Beijing’s air pollution (Duan & Takahashi, 2016). Based 
on a review of newspaper coverage of Beijing’s air pollution between the U.S. and China from 
2008 to 2013, Duan and Takahashi (2016) suggested that the Chinese media was more likely to 
have a self-justification theme linking pollution with foggy weather or other non-air quality related 
substances. Specifically, China Daily expressed much less criticism and put a lot of effort into 
stressing government determination and commitment to tackle the issue compared to its U.S. 
counterpart. However, this does not mean there is no negative depiction of the Chinese government 
in the Chinese news media.  
In a longitudinal content analysis of the P ople’s Daily from 1977 to 2010, Zhao (2014) found 
that criticism of Chinese central government had been constantly rare but did exist. It is interesting 
that most of them were self-critiques made by high official CCP leaders rather than direct blame 
for the central government actions. There were more frequent occasions on which an article 
targeted at a regional branch or department of the government for failing to implement central 
decisions properly. Overall, therefore, it can be seen that the tendency to consistently advocate the 




As societies increasingly rely on media to act as a primary information source, the significance 
of journalism as a social institution has to be recognized. It is also important to explore the 
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socialization of journalists and the strong way in which this influences media content. Shoemaker 
and Reese (2014) consider journalistic socialization to be a process that occurs in the occupational 
setting, in which communicators are taught their business norms and supported in developing their 
professional identity. The researchers emphasize journalistic socialization as an on-going concern 
in media sociology, as it provides a cluster of shared values for journalists that will heavily shape 
how a story is written and how an event is viewed. Media sociologists have therefore conducted 
some scientific investigation to explore how various social forces shape media messages. Here, 
researchers argue that journalists, as social actors and the centre of the meaning creation process, 
are subject to several potential determinants: journalistic codes, organizational routines, economic 
imperatives and other constraints. Tunstall’s (1971) study concluded that in order to be 
administrable, the vast majority of correspondents’ work must follow their employing 
organizations’ habitual methods or procedures, which causes standardized patterns of news 
reporting to emerge.  In the late 1970s, with the revival of critical media study, Tuchman (1978) 
considered media as social organization continually expediting and imposing dominant ideology 
to the public, due to the routine relations between journalists’ and their sources. Tuchman (2003) 
also noted that news was more “produced” than “found”. The notion of news therefore required 
scholars to explore the social and organizational contexts of news reports. Recent studies on media 
production have not only examined institutional constraints that media practitioners have had to 
deal with on a day to day basis, but have also extended their attention to restraints beyond media 
organizations, which offers insight into journalism as an occupation containing normative 
frameworks and practice that is deeply influenced by historical, cultural economic and political 
contexts in a specific nation (Dickinson, 2007). Investigating newsroom culture provided an 
analytical approach to understanding how ordinary journalists collaborated with their colleagues 
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and news sources under changing occupational conditions and employment contexts. Journalistic 
socialization refers to the process wherein media practitioners enter the newsroom environment, 
have to learn how journalism is accomplished in the specific organization, and are required to 
make situational adjustments (Dickinson, 2007). Through the process of journalistic socialization, 
scholars are able to investigate routine mechanisms in the newsroom setting - factors that 
journalists highly valued in their work and their occupational commitment. 
 
 Related theories  
Studies focused on how journalists become socialized in their professionals and theoretical 
links between influences and media content have received longstanding attention in mass 
communication research. One of the most well-known efforts is Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) 
hierarchy of influences model, which attempts to explore how influences from multiple societal 
levels shape media content. As discussed earlier, there are five levels of influence presented by 
Shoemaker and Reese (2014): social system; social institution; organization; routines; and 
individuals. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) believed that the social system operates on the most 
macro level, as it provides the overarching context to understand communication structure, media 
organizations, and other powerful institutions in a society. It defines the ways in which media work 
is incorporated, the standardized pattern of journalistic norms and the values that are practiced. It 
can be understood as an aggregation of subsystems, including ideological, economic, political, 
cultural and mass communication institutions. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) proposed that media 
sociologists should pay more attentions to exploring the differences between the social structures 
in different societies. As a powerful influence of media content creation, the social system can 
sometimes be difficult, as to some extent that they have been taken for granted and naturalized in 
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day-to-day activities. The second-level of influences Shoemaker and Reese (2014) suggested 
comes from social institutions, which underlines the interrelationships between media 
organizations and other power centers in society. As media workers strongly depend on diverse 
media sources for a range of information, it is reasonable to consider how political elites, interest 
groups, advertisers and audiences exert their power over media news frames in an attempt to serve 
their own interests.  
The third level of influence refers to more comprehensive institutional necessity within media 
organizations, which would normally require media content to remain in accordance with a group 
of crucial benchmarks, including ownership, policies, goals, action rules, bureaucratic structure 
and economic viability.  
The fourth level of analysis comprises organizational routines and a standardized pattern of 
news production. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) proposed that whilst most journalistic rules are 
unwritten, they still have an enormous effect on the news creation process, as media workers utilize 
routines as guidance for carrying out their jobs.  
The final level of influence comes from journalists themselves. Specifically, it refers to the 
way in which journalists’ individual characteristics (personal demographic features, backgrounds, 
roles and experience related to the professional context of the communicator, the work position of 
the communicator within an organization, etc.) affect the news creation process.  
The hierarchical model is not the only attempt to deconstruct the underlying process of news 
production. The five-level model theorized by McQuail (2010) shows how power and influence 
could be exercised on the mass communicator, with the levels being the individual role, 
organization, medium/industry/institution, societal level, and international level. McQuail (2010) 
considered that the influence a communicator has confronted is not hierarchical, which means that 
30 
even these influences are coming from five different levels, and none of them are more prime than 
the other in terms of strength and direction. McQuail (2010) also implied that the interactive and 
negotiable relationships between mass communicators and their environments allow media 
institution to operate with a certain degree of autonomy and sustain its ‘boundaries’ with other 
social forces. This model provides the perspective to discuss the individual news worker, whose 
work is considered subordinate to organizational needs. It also expands the discussion to wider 
media agents and society. More importantly, as McQuail (2010) said, “media organizations in their 
relations with the wider society are formally or informally regulated or influenced by normative 
expectations on either side. Such matters as the essential freedoms of publication and the ethical 
guidelines for many professional activities are laid down by the ‘rules of the game’ of the particular 
society” (p.280). This suggests that the factors that influence the relationship between media 
groups and other societal agents are not limited to legislation, market situation or political elite, 
but also could be some widely accepted social and cultural rules.  
On the other hand, Donsbach (2004) took a different perspective to look at journalists’ 
psychological decisions in news making, and proposed that there are two cognitive processes 
involved: the need for social validation of perceptions and the need to preserve someone’s existing 
predispositions. The first one focuses more on the social nature of the human being. The majority 
of journalists’ work includes summarizing a story – making decisions as to what is factual and 
what is needed to provide perspective. When journalists attempt to make evaluative news decisions, 
they also consistently face four specific problems (Donsbach, 2004): time pressure, pressure of 
competition, lack of objective criteria, and publicness. In order to better cope with such uncertainty, 
social psychologists have found that media professionals rely heavily on “shared reality” to 
evaluate the event. This shared reality is an experience that has been established as ‘valid’, ‘correct’ 
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and ‘proper’ to the extent that it is widely recognized and approved of by a group of people. 
Donsbach (2004) noted that for journalists, the specific group of people with whom they shared 
their beliefs, opinions and attitudes would be other journalists, since social interaction and media 
consonance are parts of the journalistic profession. Normally, there are several journalists 
reporting the same event, and they pay much attention to how other media cover the story. More 
importantly, the ‘shared reality’ not only influences how different journalists cover current stories, 
it also builds common expectations for similar events in the future (Donsbach, 2004). The ‘shared 
reality’ amongst journalists can also be understood as news ideologies, which are used to determine 
the newsworthiness of an event and mirror the role journalists play in a particular social system. 
The second psychological factor involved in news decisions, as proposed by Donsbach (2004), is 
a journalist’s existing knowledge and attitude. The strength of predisposition can be detected based 
on the selective attention paid by journalists to certain events, selective perception of certain 
aspects and selective retention when storing messages. 
 
Comparing Chinese and American journalism practices 
     Shoemaker and Reese (2014) demonstrated that the transformation of social relations and 
intensified globalization process require media scholars to extend the U.S. and UK based version 
of media sociology. It is important for researchers to be more sensitive to the global context in 
order to investigate journalism culture in a more comprehensive manner. Recent communication 
research has adopted this approach and placed emphasis on cultural, political and economic factors 
to evaluate journalism practice in America as well as in China.  
     Based on an examination of the available empirical research, this section of the paper reviews 
how journalism practices differ in China and U.S. This section particularly intended to provide a 
32 
comparison of journalists’ role perception, perceived influence and journalistic trust in public 
institutions. Most of the information provided below was sourced from The Worlds of Journalism 
Study (WJS), which was a joint academic project that has studied comparative journalism across 
the globe since 2007 onwards. This project currently has researchers from 66 countries, including 
China and the U.S., engaged in exploring diverse journalistic issues that news organizations 
encounter today. 
 
     Role perception     Journalists’ role perception refers to the way in which media workers think 
about the diverse roles involved in journalism that allows the news media to function in society. 
By analyzing the survey results from 1,800 journalists in 18 countries, Hanitzsch (2011) 
conceptualized four global professional milieus for journalists: the populist disseminator, detached 
watchdog, critical change agent, and the opportunist facilitator. These are based on three general 
dimensions: interventionism (to what extent journalists pursue a particular objective or promote 
certain values), power distance (to what position journalists tend to situate with the ruling power 
in society), and market orientation (how journalists consider the audience – i.e. as citizens or 
consumers). The first professional milieu - populist disseminator – refers to the group of journalists 
who are “most likely to provide the audience with interesting information and concentrate mainly 
on news that attracts the widest possible audience” (Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 484). Journalists from this 
group share a strong tendency to be a detached and objective observer rather than an active 
participant in order to report a story.   The second professional milieu of journalists is the ‘detached 
watchdog’ type. Media workers of this group identify as watchdogs of business elites and 
government officials, who adhere to a critical and skeptical attitude towards these powerful groups. 
However, these journalists are not interested in advocating social change or setting political 
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agenda. In terms of their audience orientation, Hanitzsch (2011) indicated that this group feels 
obligated to disseminate political information in a timely manner in order to help citizens make 
democratic decisions. Additionally, they tend to frame tedious political stories in a more interesting 
manner to promote sales.  Hanitzsch (2011) suggested this professional milieu might best represent 
Western journalists. The third cluster (critical change agent) holds a similarly skeptical attitude to 
the detached watchdog type with regards to the elites. However, journalists in this milieu are most 
likely to advocate social change and influence public opinion. They show intense desire to 
persuade their audiences to engage in civil discussion and political activity. Another characteristic 
of this cluster is that they are the least audience-orientated group. In other words, they weakly 
support ideas such as “attracting a wide audience” and “providing interesting stories”. The 
opportunist facilitator group constitutes the last of the professional milieu, which possesses a 
“relatively strong opportunist view of journalism’s role in society, namely as constructive partners 
of the government in the process of economic development and political transformation” 
(Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 486). That is to say, members of this cluster are most likely to demonstrate a 
supportive attitude towards government policies and present a positive image of political and 
business elites. This group does not primarily perceive themselves to be detached observers whilst 
reporting an event. Moreover, “they pay least regard to the political information function and 
mobilization potentials of journalism” (Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 486). Figure 1, below, presents a clear 
outline of how the four professional milieus are distributed in the U.S. and China. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of professional milieus (Hanitzsch, 2011) 
     According to Hanitzsch (2011), the prevailing perceived role of American journalists is the 
detached watchdog type (63 percent), wherein the press is characterized by uninvolved 
participation and perceived journalism as Fourth Estate. The second large professional milieu in 
the U.S. is the critical change agent type (21 percent). Members of this cluster are devoted to 
motivating citizens to participate in civil activities and potential social change. The populist 
disseminator and opportunist facilitator types occupy 11 percent and 4 percent, respectively. In 
China, however, the opportunist facilitator dominates the journalistic field at 56 percent, wherein 
journalists perceive themselves as advocators and partners for government policies. This result is 
accordance with Chen, Zhu and Wu’s (1998) research. In their study, 64 percent of respondents 
attached priority to the “mouthpiece” role, which considers disseminating and explaining 
government regulations and the Communist Party of China (CPC) parties to be the most important 
duties. Thus, Hanitzsch (2011) argued that such a constructive role is strongly associated with the 
relatively low extent of press freedom and the interwoven linkage between the ruling party and 
media business. Because supporting the ruling elites reigns supreme in China in terms of role 
perception, it is not surprising to see that only 1 percent of journalists perceive themselves as the 
detached watchdog. Additionally, 25 percent of Chinese respondents identify as critical change 
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     Perceived influence     Based on the recent study exploring journalists’ perceptions of influence 
using survey data collected from 1,700 journalists from 18 countries around the globe, Hanitzsch, 
and Mellado (2011) proposed six patterns of influence that journalists perceive in their professions: 
political influences, economic influences, organizational influences, procedural influences, 
professional influences and reference groups. Political influences refer to pressure and constraint 
from the political context (government officials, politicians and censorship). Economic influences 
are found in the expectation that journalists’ work to meet the profit goals of media organizations, 
advertisers and the needs of market. Organizational influences represent influences of management 
and editorial routines from multiple levels within media organizations. Procedural influences are 
conceptualized as “the various operational constraints faced by journalists in their everyday work, 
most notably those related to limited resources in terms of time and space as well as to establish 
standards and routines of news work” (Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011, p.4). Professional influences 
incorporate the effect of media policies, regulations and professional norms of journalistic 
practices in general. The impact of reference groups is understood to come from various media 
sources, such as journalists in other media organizations, audiences, friends and families. The six 
dimensions of influences are measured as dependent variables on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning 
not influential at all in their daily jobs and 5 meaning extremely influential. Table 1 illustrates the 
mean scores of each influence type for Chinese and American journalists as perceived in their 
work.  













M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
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China 3.23 0.82 2.79 0.88 3.49 0.89 4.12 0.70 3.02 0.68 3.49 0.74 
U.S. 1.75 0.89 2.22 0.95 3.78 0.86 3.46 0.85 2.90 0.80 3.84 0.78 
 
     As per the mean scores illustrated in Table 1, media workers in China perceived relatively high 
political influences in their jobs. On the other hand, journalists in U.S. felt much less impact from 
political factors. Additionally, higher economic influences are found amongst Chinese journalists 
compared to their counterparts in the U.S. Procedural influences have the largest impact in U.S., 
with professional influences and organizational influences considered secondary and tertiary 
amongst American journalists. On the other hand, organizational influences are highest in China, 
followed by professional influences and procedural influences. Media workers from both the U.S. 
and China perceive relatively strong influences from reference groups.  Hanitzsch and Mellado 
(2011) believed that the differences that exist between journalists’ perceived levels of political 
influences are not only related to the political features of society (index of democracy, level of 
press freedom and levels of political parallelism), but also to media ownership. The researchers 
concluded, “Media organizations that are owned by the state directly fall under the jurisdiction of 
the government. Under such circumstances, it is clear that members of the government have more 
power over newsroom decisions, either directly manipulating content or indirectly by placing 
“their” people in the editorial management” (Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011, p.15). 
 
     Journalistic trust in public institutions     Based on the assumption that journalist’ attitudes 
towards public institutions affect the content they create, and based on the survey results of 2,000 
journalists, Hanitzsch and Berganza (2012) further explored the decisive forces behind journalists’ 
trust in public institutions. Enlightened by prior research, Hanitzsch and Berganza (2012) 
37 
categorized four main determinants to explain journalists’ confidence in public institutions: 
performance, interpersonal trust, media ownership and journalistic culture. Performance can b  
subdivided into the economic performance of a country (measured by gross domestic product and 
total GDP growth between 1998 and 2008) and general political performance (measured by press 
freedom, the index of democracy and corruption perceptions index). Interpersonal trust is 
introduced based on a cultural hypothesis that the more people have faith in each other in one 
society, the more opportunity for them to have institutional trust (Hanitzsch & Berganza, 2012). 
This variable is adopted from the World Values Survey 1999-2007. Here, media ownership is 
differentiated into three operational systems: private, public and state-owned. State-owned media 
organizations are expected to demonstrate less criticism of the government and show greater trust 
in public institutions due to governments’ tight control over editorial management.  
In this research, power distance is utilized to measure journalistic culture, which represents 
journalism’s position toward the ruling elite of a society. Institutional trust is measured on a 5-
point rating scale, with Table 2 providing a summary of the differences between Chinese and 
American journalists’ institutional trust. 
Table 2. Institutional trust and performance (Hanitzsch & Berganza, 2012) 























China 2.34(.66) 84 3.04 3.60 6,187 209.5 52.3 3.21 
U.S. 1.79(.63) 17 8.22 7.30 46,901 47.2 39.3 3.39 
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     As reported in Table 2, Chinese journalists indicate relatively higher institutional trust than 
American journalists. Journalists in China actually exhibit the highest confidence in public 
institutions amongst the eighteen investigated countries. Hanitzsch and Berganza (2012) reasoned 
there are four main reasons for the relatively high institutional trust showed amongst Chinese 
journalists. First, that confidence is closely connected with transformation in the political and 
economic realm over a short-time period. It is believed that people may express higher satisfaction 
with institutional performance when they come to be conscious of positive changes in their lives 
(i.e. GDP growth), even other benchmarks (i.e. GDP, index of press freedom) only have relatively 
inferior performance. Secondly, Hanitzsch and Berganza (2012) stated “survey respondents have 
usually limited personal experience to make informed comparison between the situation in their 
countries and other societies” (p.805). Thirdly, due to the comparatively authoritarian political 
context in China, journalists may not express their true thoughts to politically sensitive questions. 
Lastly, the majority of media in China is state-owned, while most media in U.S. is owned privately. 
Hanitzsch and Berganza (2012) pointed out that journalists exhibit more trust in public institutions 
when they work for state-owned media. 
 
Research Questions 
     This study compared the use of frames in different media outlets and considers whether there 
are salient differences between the U.S. and Chinese media, how they differ and why they differ. 
Coverage from The New York Times and the People’s Daily are examined for comparative 
analysis. These two newspapers are selected due to their prominence, influence on other media, 
and large circulation. The core research question in this study is: How did The New York Times 
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and People’s Daily compare in framing President Xi’s 2015 state visit, and what political, 
ideological and cultural factors may explain their frames? 
     Building upon the theory and research of framing and journalism socialization, three research 
questions and one hypothesis are proposed in this study:  
RQ 1: What are frames employed in the coverage of President Xi's state visit by the People’s Daily 
and The New York Times? 
     Based on the different power distance and ideologies China and U.S. pertain to, as well as prior 
content analysis of Chinese media, Hypothesis 1 is proposed as follows: 
H1: Due to the large power distance China features – compared to the U.S. – in combination with 
its journalism unconditionally toeing the party’s dominant ideology, the general assessment of 
President Xi’s state visit should be dominantly positive in People’s Daily. 
RQ2: What issue of the state visit is the most salient in the coverage of Th  New York Times and 
the People’s Daily? (i.e., military power, economy, environment, cyber security, human rights, 
education, general Sino-U.S. relations, other.) 
RQ3: What information sources do the P ople’s Daily and The New York Times primarily cite?      
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     This study adopted quantitative content analysis (a combination of prior and emergent coding) 
and a qualitative assessment of overall frames in the news and editorials articles of published in 
The New York Times and People’s Daily from September 10th, 2015 to October 10th, 2015. The 
actual state visit was from September 22th to September 28th, 2015. The time frame was selected 
because media started to warm up the trip twelve days before the official state visit. Additionally, 
President Xi addressed the speech at the U.N. on September 28th. Therefore, this study extended 
its search two weeks after the state visit in order to include any follow-up news reports. 
 
Content analysis 
Quantitative content analysis is one of the most significant research mechanisms in mass 
communication research, which is useful for researchers to explore what audiences are encouraged 
to think, attend and expose to media message (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Berelson (1952) 
explained, “content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative 
description of the manifest content of communication" (p.489). Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2005) 
defined quantitative content analysis as “the systematic assignment of communication content to 
categories according to rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those categories using 
statistical methods” (p. 3). They further emphasized the relationship between content analysis and 
content production: “News content is the product or consequence of those routines, practices, and 
values, is constructed by news workers, and reflects both the professional cultural of journalism 
and the larger society” (p.9). By examining news content, researchers could understand antecedent 
choices journalists and editors made in mass communication and what was happening at the time 
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of their production. From a cultural perspective, examining symbols used in media messages 
during a given period of time would reflect the dominant culture and ideology of that period, using 
specific images, messages or themes to clearly reveal antecedent cultural values (Shoemaker & 
Reese, 2014). 
 
The People’s Daily and The New York Times 
     This study chose The New York Times and the People’s Daily as representatives of newspaper 
coverage in the two countries. They were selected for this content analysis because they are 
widely considered as the most important national newspapers in their own country. In Pan’s 
(2008) comparative study of framing anti-war protests, coverage from The New York Times and 
the People’s Daily was used, and the reason for this choice was “their content influences other 
newspapers, wire services, news magazines and television and radio news, and has a big impact 
on public opinion” (p.367). Although the newspaper industry has experienced an overall decline 
in circulation, the newspaper is still acknowledged as a reliable source of providing information, 
interpreting important public events (Hiebert & Gibbons, 2000). 
     In the case of The New York Times, it stands as an eminent newspaper in the United States 
and the world in general. Its total average circulation, which includes total print and total digital, 
was 2,178,674 for Monday-Friday and 2,624,277 for Sunday (O’Shea, 2015). It is generally 
believed as not only the most influential newspaper regarding U.S. domestic politics setting the 
agenda for other U.S. news media sources, but also exercises its strong influence on politicians 
and foreign policies in U.S. (Pan, 2008). The powerful impact The New York Times exerts on the 
international community has been recognized for a long time (Merrill, 1968). Many previous 
comparative studies had chosen it to represent the U.S. elite daily (e.g., Pan, 2008; Ma, 2008; 
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Hussein, 1996; Curran et.al, 2009). Elite press, as suggested by Merrill and Fisher (1980), is 
more likely to convey more serious and well-processed opinions of public events. Its website, 
nytimes.com, is one of the world’s most popular English-language newspaper websites. 
According to statistics of The Guardian, it drew 41.6 million worldwide unique visitors in 
October 2014.  
     The People’s Daily is selected to represent Chinese “elite press”, which is the official 
newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It was founded in 1948 
and is published worldwide in Chinese with a current circulation of 3 million. As one of the most 
influential and authoritative newspapers in China, it not only expresses Party voices, official 
regulations and policies, but also decides what is the appropriate tone for Chinese news media 
covering public events (Pan, 2008). It maintains an online presence as the Peopl 's Daily Online 
(people.cn), which is one of the most important news portals in China and provides information 
in 15 languages. According to the introduction of people.cn (2015), it now ranks as second most 
popular newspaper website worldwide with monthly unique users of 89.1 million. However, it 
should be noted that there are different media ownerships existing behind the People’s Daily and 
The New York Times. The New York Times i  completely privatized, while the People’s Daily 
remains primarily state-owned. Even though the Chinese government implemented a systematic 
reform in media in the late 1970s (most party or state owned media organizations have attained 
financial autonomy from the state and are gradually becoming profit-making operations), there is 
still no fully independent and private newspaper in China available for this study. In fact, the 
People’s Daily is the only newspaper equivalent to The New York Times, because of its 




Stories published by The New York Times were accessed by a key word search (President Xi 
state visit or China president state visit) from the nytimes.com and 66 articles were collected. 
Stories published by the People’s Daily were screened by key terms searching (President Xi state 
visit or China president state visit in Chinese) from the people.cn and 112 articles were found. 
All news articles and editorials of President Xi’ U.S. state visit were selected from September 
10th 2015, twelve days before the official state visit, to October 10th, 2015, two weeks after the 
state visit.  
 
Coding Scheme 
     The unit of analysis for this research is full content. Specifically, the study pinpoints the units 
of analysis including, issue salience, assessment of the state visit and main source. Issue salience 
is used as coding units for salient issues identified in news messages. The general assessment of 
President Xi’s state visit is used to code a rhetorical device used in news content. The main 
source is used to code incidence of sources attributed in the story. In addition, 20 percent of the 
sampling of this study was used as the initial assessment of media coverage. It also provides the 
foundation from which to develop further variables for the coding book used in analyzing the 
news frames from U.S. and Chinese coverage. 
     Issue salience: In the entire article, issue salience was coded. In other words, coders located 
content referring to the issue of the state visit in the story. There are eight categories:  military 
power (i.e., South China Sea tension); economy (i.e., the importance of trade and business 
cooperation in a bilateral relationship); environment (i.e., policy to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions); cyber security (i.e., the cyberattacks and intellectual property issues); human rights 
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(i.e., democracy in China); education (i.e., to have American students learn Mandarin); general 
Sino-U.S. relations (i.e., new pattern of relationship between great powers); others. 
     The general assessment of President Xi’s state visit: the coder located content that provided 
the general assessment of president Xi’s state visit. Based on its inherent meaning and rhetoric 
description of the visit, it was categorized into four categories: a successful trip (i.e., President 
Xi’s visit to U.S. is a major success); not an effective visit (i.e., Mr. Xi has in many ways 
confounded Mr. Obama’s hopes and expectations); combination of achievement and conflicts in 
the state visit; not mentioned. 
     Main source: All news sources and their tones were used to measure items quoted, 
paraphrased or attributed in the story.  The sources include twelve groups: President Xi; 
President Obama; Chinese official (i.e., President Xi’s entourage); U.S. officials (i.e., U.S. 
congressman, U.S. senator); Chinese scholars (i.e., Chinese scholars who study Sino-U.S. 
relations and international relations); U.S. scholars (i.e., scholars who study Sino-U.S. relations 
and international relations);other foreign media (i.e., the Guardian, BBC News); Chinese 
citizens; American citizens; Chinese entrepreneurs; U.S. entrepreneurs; others. 
 
Coding and Inter-Coder Reliability 
Two coders, who are fluent in Mandarin and English, participated in the coding procedure. 
All coders used a standard coding sheet written in English. Prior to coding articles, coders 
received training with 5 articles, which were not included in the study sample. In the training 
process, any inconsistent coding or unclear instructions were identified and clarified.  The inter-
coder reliability indicates the level of agreement among independent coders who code the same 
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material using the same coding instruction (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006), which was calculated 
in this study through Scott’s pi and achieved 0.83 agreements. 
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     This study compared the use of frames in different media outlets and considered whether 
salient differences exist between the U.S. and Chinese media, how they differ, and why they 
differ. Specifically, this study examined news frame, issue salience regarding the state visit, the 
general assessment of President Xi, and cited sources of coverage in The New York Times and 
People’s Daily.  
     The number of mentioning President Xi’s first state visit in People’s Daily was found to be 
nearly twice that of The New York Times. During the selected period (September 10th – Oc ober 
10th 2015), 112 related stories were published in the People’s Daily, while only 66 stories were 
found in The New York Times. Five dominant frames emerged in the two newspapers’ coverage 
of President Xi’s first state visit to the U.S., namely: the anti-China frame; the provocateur 
frame; the recognition frame; the great-leader frame; and the description frame. In terms of issue 
salience, People’s Daily mentioned 261 issues in total (or 2.33 issues per story) while The New 
York Times referred to 125 issues (or 1.89 issues per story). In both newspapers, the most 
frequently discussed issue was the economy. In terms of cited sources, People’s Daily used a 
total of 648 sources (or 5.79 sources per story), whereas The New York Times used 446 sources 
(or 6.76 sources per story). The New York Times quoted U.S. officials the most, while the most 
commonly quoted source in People’s Daily’s coverage was President Xi. The next section 
highlights the findings from the data in light of the research questions and provides preliminary 
analysis. 
RQ1: What frames are employed in the coverage of President Xi's state visit by People’s 
Daily and The New York Times? 
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     The press coverage of President Xi’s first state visit in the U.S. exhibited a consistent pattern 
of media framing regardless of the difference in national politics, ideologies and culture. Both 
The New York Times and People’s Daily underscored certain parts of the state visit and 
provided corresponding interpretations for mass audiences to understand the unfolding events. 
As noted above, five major news frames appeared from the press coverage of the two 
newspapers (anti-China frame, provocateur frame, recognition frame, great-leader frame and 
description frame). Each frame is comprised of a number of subthemes, which are elaborated 
below: 
























Anti-China Frame      
     Consistent with the work of Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998), Wu (2006), and Hook 
and Pu (2006), The New York Times’ coverage was largely critical of the Chinese government’s 
action. This frame primarily depicted China as facing all kinds of crisis. Almost half (48 percent) 
of coverage in The New York Times pertained to this frame. Specifically, China was described in 
terms of weak economic performance, human rights controversy and aggressive military policy 
48 
(i.e., South China Sea and cyberattack), providing the foundation for extensive criticism of China 
as an opponent country to America. Skepticism regarding the Chinese economy was demonstrated 
in three aspects. The first doubt came from the uncertain performance of the Chinese stock market 
and broad economy:  
As President Xi Jinping heads to the United States next week for the first state visit by a 
Chinese leader in more than four years, his government is striving to restore confidence in 
its ability to manage the world’s second-largest economy, after that of America. But the 
state’s panicked response to the stock market slide and its surprise currency devaluation last 
month are causing concerns about China’s growth prospects. (Forsythe, 2015).  
     Secondly, this excerpt applies direct negative market expectations to China: “That said, China’s 
stock market is a hot mess right now, and the country may be reaching the end of an era of 
enormous economic growth.” (Manjoo & Issac, 2015).  
In addition to explicitly highlighting China’s slowing economy, The New York Times also 
discussed other emerging markets in the world. The article titled “India Replaces China as Next 
Big Frontier for U.S. Tech Companies” made the following assertion: 
Blocked from China itself or frustrated by the onerous demands of its government, 
companies like Facebook, Google and Twitter, as well as start-ups and investors, see India 
as the next best thing. (Goel, 2015).  
The article even made comparison between President Xi and India’s Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi to emphasize the unamiable attitude of Chinese government:  
During a meeting in Seattle on Wednesday with American technology executives, China’s 
president, Xi Jinping, was unwavering on his government’s tough Internet policies. India’s 
prime minister, Narendra Modi, on the other hand, was on a charm offensive during his own 
American tour. (Goel, 2015).  
This mentality of distrust was also expressed through the concern over the commitment China 
has made regarding climate change and its heavy reliance on coal-fired energy. In the article 
“China to Announce Cap-and-Trade Program to Limit Emissions”, the following point is made: 
Mr. Xi’s pledge underscores China’s intention to act quickly and upends what has long been 
a potent argument among Republicans against acting on climate change: that the United 
States’ most powerful economic competitor has not done so. But it is not clear whether China 
will be able to enact and enforce a program that substantially limits emissions. China’s 
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economy depends heavily on cheap coal-fired electricity, and the country has a history of 
balking at outside reviews of its industries. China has also been plagued by major corruption 
cases, particularly among coal companies. (Davis & Davenport, 2015).   
The New York Times also cited experts’ opinions on China’s promise to curb carbon emissions 
and presented these opinions with obvious doubt:  
The challenges in China are compounded by unreliable statistics, corruption and local 
officials who have made blazing economic growth a point of honor. Overcoming those 
problems will demand far-reaching changes to the energy sector, so that trading emissions 
translates into reduced consumption of coal and other polluting fuels, several experts said. 
(Buckley, 2015). 
The second dominant script under the anti-China frame is the depiction of the Chinese 
government as a human rights’ abuser. The frequency of this script inThe New York Times articles 
was 10 (15 percent). The key word “activist” appeared 24 times, “arrest” 20 times, and “detained” 
18 times. Based on those key words, it is clear that China was framed as being a society facing the 
deterioration of free expression and a strongly oppressive political force. Activists and their family 
members are portrayed as continuously having their freedom restricted in various ways by the 
Chinese government:  
As of Wednesday, at least 286 lawyers, legal staff, human rights advocates and their family 
members have been detained, arrested, held incommunicado, forbidden to leave the country, 
questioned, summoned or had their freedom restricted. Of these: Twenty-seven have been 
criminally detained or are under “residential surveillance” in a secret location. At least 10 
of those detained have been charged with national security crimes, none of whom has been 
permitted to see a lawyer. Those in criminal detention have been held incommunicado for 
46 to 69 days. Eighteen people have been forbidden to leave China, including six children 
of lawyers. (Tatlow, 2015).  
 
     In addition to providing profiles of imprisoned writers, scholars and intellectuals who were 
imprisoned for their political views, The New York Times also tended to feature stories associated 
with the pro-democracy demonstration in Hong Kong, which was the most recent movement that 
evoked an image of the Chinese government repressing activists’ protest. One story quoted a Hong 
Kong activist’s warning about how the Chinese government was untrustworthy and how 
Americans should not trust the promises it makes:  
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“If China doesn’t deliver on democracy on Hong Kong, then your president ought to know 
that any agreement that he might enter into with Xi Jinping could end up the same way,” 
Mr. Lee said. (Gladstone, 2015).  
Aside from citing activist comments, The New York Times also made its own judgment clear 
regarding the Chinese government’s intervention in democracy in Hong Kong, and it attributed 
the rejection of an appointment of a Hong Kong University professor to Beijing’s influence:  
But supporters of Mr. Chan say the vote is the latest sign of the growing influence of 
mainland China’s authoritarian politics in the vibrant civic life of Hong Kong, where many 
fear that the semiautonomous city’s cherished freedoms are being eroded. They say Mr. 
Chan was rejected because of pressure from Beijing. (Forsythe, 2015).  
The New York Times also insinuated that releasing the scholar who helped activists gain U.S.S 
asylum was interpreted as a publicity stunt:  
Hu Jia, a prominent Chinese dissident and a friend of Mr. Guo’s, described his release as a 
“diplomatic card” that the government hoped would ease criticism of Beijing’s crackdown 
on independent journalists, rights lawyers and advocates for political reform. (Jacobs, 
2015).  
     The summit meeting that President Xi’s attended in United Nations to recognize the 20th 
anniversary of a landmark women’s rights conference in Beijing was also used as an opportunity 
to criticize China for imprisoning prominent feminist activists. Only one article mentioned that 
U.S. had also lagged on women’s rights and that both America and China could commit greater 
effort on women’s issues:  
Women’s rights advocates point out that neither the United States nor China has a spotless 
record on women’s rights. A World Bank study this month said the United States was one of 
four countries around the world with no national laws requiring paid parental leave. The 
United States has also not met the global target for having women make up at least 30 
percent of its legislature, and its share of roughly 19 percent is significantly lower than that 
of many countries in the world. (Sengupta, 2015). 
     In addition to the portrayal of China as an abuser of human rights, The New York Times also 
framed its coverage around the image of an aggressive and threatening Chinese government with 
regards to the military issue. This script appeared 12 times (18 percent) in The New York Times 
reports, focusing on denouncing China’s military expansion both in cyberspace and the South 
China Sea. In the article “China Building Airstrip on 3rd Artificial Island, Images Show”, the 
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author repeatedly used the term “contested water” to describe the South China Sea, which is the 
area China claimed to have “indisputable sovereignty” over. The report also cited Western 
analysts’ views on how these artificial islands would strengthen China’s military capacity and how 
the airstrip would function in order to communicate the message that China was threating U.S. 
interests in East Asia:  
In April, when satellite images showed that China was building the 10,000-foot runway on 
Fiery Cross, 170 miles west of Mischief Reef, American military analysts called the 
installation a strategic game changer. The size of the runway meant a fighter jet could land 
on the island, they said. (Perlez, 2015).   
     Besides presenting China’s military expansion in South China Sea, this script also mentioned 
additional aggressive military performance in the form of China endangering U.S. homeland 
security. A Chinese fighter jet passed a United States spy plane 80 miles east of the Shandong 
Peninsula in the Yellow Sea. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei stated that 
“China was committed to maritime and aviation security”, whereas Pentagon officials declared 
that “the Chinese fighter jet executed a barrel roll, apparently to show off its weapons payload to 
the American pilot” and “China has continued to show off its military prowess to the United States 
in the years since the Hainan episode. This month, five Chinese Navy ships entered United States 
territorial waters off  Alaska, Defense Department officials said. That move came as President 
Obama was touring Alaska” (Cooper, 2015). This script also quotes third party resources to 
highlight extensive complaints about China’s military strategy and referred to it as the “Chinese 
Invasion”: “Renato Etac, 35, a fishing boat captain who says Chinese vessels there routinely chase 
and try to ram his ship. “I can’t even count the Chinese ships I see, there are so many” (Hernandez, 
2015).  
     Aside from condemning China’s threatening military presence in East Asia, the cyber threat 
China posed gained high-profile media attention. First, The New York Times reports tended to 
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underline the large-scale cyber espionage that the Chinese military has been hugely involved in 
has become a critical national security threat, from “Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army 
in China was exposed as the force behind the theft of intellectual property from American 
companies” to “the theft of the 22 million security dossiers from the Office of Personnel 
Management”. Just one day before President Xi met with President Obama in the White House, 
the report still emphasized, “the Office of Personnel Management said Wednesday that the hackers 
who stole security dossiers from the agency also got the fingerprints of 5.6 million federal 
employees” (Sanger,2015) and attributed this attack to China. Coverage of failed dialogue between 
the U.S. and China on the cyberattack issue helped to depict an uncooperative and obstinate 
Chinese government in the face of high-tension bilateral relations:  
Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, described the talks with the Chinese as 
“pretty blunt,” and one of the officials who met with Mr. Meng, China’s domestic security 
chief, was less diplomatic, calling the talks “pretty ugly”. (Sanger, 2015).   
     Skepticism about the fulfillment of the Chinese government’s promise to address intellectual 
property theft was demonstrated after President Xi and President Obama agreed to stop 
cybercrime:  
Spencer Rascoff, chief executive of Zillow, a real estate website, who was at the technology 
meeting, “They are saying all the right things. But the American business community is still 
skeptical — actions speak louder than words”. (Perlez & Wingfield, 2015).  
     The New York Times reports also cited Obama’s warning regarding America’s willingness to 
take sanctions against China if China continued its rampant cyber espionage:  
Mr. Obama said in a question-and-answer session with business leaders on economic issues. 
“We are prepared to take some countervailing actions in order to get their attention”. 
(Davis, 2015).  
     Four of the articles did briefly mention that U.S. government has also often conducted similar 
cyber espionage to China, Iran and Russia, but in a self-justified way:  
And while American officials rarely discuss it, even while off the record, the idea of placing 
too many limits on America’s offensive cyberpower sends a shiver through the Pentagon and 
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its new United States Cyber Command. They believe the American-led ttack on Iran’s 
nuclear infrastructure is critical to forcing it to the bargaining table. (Sanger, 2015). 
 
Provocateur Frame      
     The second dominant frame in The New York Times coverage is the depiction of President Xi 
as a “provocateur” whose image was built as an autocrat to deliberately confront the U.S. and 
harnesses nationalism and propaganda more so than his predecessors. Of the 66 articles from Th  
New York Times, 21 stories (32 percent) included some form of the term “provocateur” to portray 
President Xi. U.S. government officials and analysts of Sino-U.S. relations were the major sources 
in The New York Times reports. On the basis of information these ‘insiders’ provided, President 
Xi was framed as an intractable and obstinate leader who continuously makes decisions against 
U.S. will in various matters.  
     In the economic sphere, reports criticized President Xi for “reasserting the primacy of the state 
regardless of the long-run economic cost” (Buckley & Perlez, 2015). With regards to foreign 
policy, the following point was made: 
Mr. Xi “seems less interested in cutting deals” than his predecessors, Professor Lampton 
said. “He has demonstrated a willingness to have more friction with the outside world than 
his predecessors” (Buckley & Perlez, 2015).  
     One report explicitly summarized President Xi as “the Chinese president who defied American 
predictions by challenging the United States’ superpower status early and directly” (Sanger & 
Davis, 2015), which has heavily frustrated and disappointed the American side due to the 
deliberate causing of friction and conflict. To practice the journalistic principle of balance, The 
New York Times report gave a Chinese scholar the opportunity to defend President Xi, quoting:  
Shen Dingli, a professor of international relations and expert on Sino-American relations at 
Fudan University in Shanghai, said American policy makers had trouble understanding Mr. 
Xi because he’s an initiator, whereas traditionally Chinese leaders were reactive, waiting to 
respond. He believes we are a major power and is more willing to confront the U.S., 
Professor Shen added. (Buckley & Perlez, 2015).  
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     Secondly, The New York Times coverage devoted a substantial attention to portraying President 
Xi as a leader whose vision is primarily built around concentrating his authority, leading to the 
suggestion of dictatorship and authoritarian control:  
After almost three years in office, Mr. Xi has amassed daunting power. He has taken control 
of the party’s most important policy committees. His scorching anticorruption campaign has 
subdued potential opponents. His prime minister and other colleagues have been relegated 
to cheerleading roles. (Buckley & Perlez, 2015).  
     In addition to describing how President Xi keeps a tight grip on his power, this script 
rhetorically employed symbolic apparatus to enhance the suggestion President Xi’s totalitarian 
attitude:  
President Xi Jinping of China looked regal as he stood in a limousine moving past 
Tiananmen Square this month, wearing a traditional suit of the kind favored by Mao and 
waving at parade troops assembled at attention. But the luster of Mr. Xi’s imperial 
presidency has dulled lately. (Buckley & Perlez, 2015).  
     To give its “power-accumulating” leader depiction more strength, The New York Times featured 
three stories on Xi Jinping’s inner circle to emphasize the opaque policy councils in his authority 
and challenges presented to the U.S. and other nations:  
The Chinese president keeps a tight grip on his power and does not permit others to speak 
for him. Foreign officials and scholars have found it difficult to penetrate President Xi’s 
inner circle and get to know the men who advise him on policy and matters of state. (Wong, 
2015).   
     The New York Times believed cold shoulders offered by President Xi’s inner circle to develop 
ties with U.S. officials arose because of the mentality the Chinese have: “Western ideas and 
influences will undermine the Communist Party and lead to a “color revolution” (Wong, 2015). 
This was also one of the reasons for Xi’s renewed emphasis on nationalism: to secure the “China 
Dream” and lead the nation along the road to rejuvenation. On the other hand, the U.S. side was 
quite negative about Xi’s top-down nationalism policy and considered it as failing to meet U.S. 
expectations for bilateral relations:  
As the most powerful leader in China in decades, Mr. Xi presented an opportunity for greater 
collaboration,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, senior adviser on Asia at the Center for Strategic and 
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International Studies. Instead, he “turned out to be an ultranationalist, bent on achieving 
the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation even if it meant damaging ties with the U.S. as 
well as China’s neighbors. (Davis & Sanger, 2015). 
     In terms of President Xi’s publicity efforts, The New York Times atirized the Chinese 
propaganda video and it was released to coincide with President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the 
United States: “What follows is three minutes of sycophantic soundbites, many of which could 
have come from Justin Bieber fans gushing about their pop idol” (Levin, 2015). 
 
Recognition Frame      
In sharp contrast to its U.S. counterpart, People’s Daily had built a generally supportive and 
complementary image of the Chinese government in its coverage of Prsident Xi’s state visit to 
the U.S. Among the 112 stories collected from the People’s Daily newspaper, 65 articles (58 
percent) were written under the recognition frame. This frame primarily refers to China as a rising 
power that must receive acceptance across the globe, stressing that its increasing global influence 
has to be recognized. The recognition frame was constructed through extensive reports expressing 
a welcoming attitude towards the U.S. side and emphasizing China’s increasing confidence and 
corresponding responsibility in the international community. One of the most important themes in 
the People’s Daily report is the insistence that President Xi received a warm welcome from the 
U.S. before and during his visit, in order to demonstrate that the trip was supposed to be an equal 
dialogue between two countries. A typical example of this can be seen in the following excerpt:  
The governor's office of Washington released the invitation letter to President Xi, which was 
written by Governor Jay Inslee on April 17. In the letter, Governor Inslee extended the 
invitation for President Xi to visit Seattle this autumn. He particularly applauded President 
Xi’s contribution to establish sister city ties between Fuzhou and Tacoma in 1994 and 
emphasized that was an important milestone and helped further strength U.S.-Sino relations. 
(Chen, 2015).  
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     In addition to citing U.S. officials’ welcoming words during the visit, this script underscored 
how President Xi reached a consensus with President Obama on various issues and China had 
earned the respect of the U.S.:  
Vice President Biden said the two presidents had candid and in-depth discussions on many 
occasions in the last two days, adding that both sides reached broad consensus on 
strengthening mutual trust, promoting cooperation in various fields, and properly managing 
their differences. He reaffirmed his country's stance that China's peaceful development will 
have a positive influence on the world. The United States and China share broad common 
interests, and there is no problem that cannot be resolved although there are indeed some 
problems between the two countries, he said, the two countries are facing competition, but it 
is a healthy one. (Du, 2015).  
     In order to make sense of the “welcomed by the U.S.” script, reasoning devices were used in 
the People’s Daily reports to provide plausible explanations for the respectful and courteous 
treatment President Xi received from the Obama administration. First and foremost was the 
importance of Sino-U.S. relations. Not only would a partnership between the two nations have a 
tremendous impact on the lives of citizens in each of the two countries, such relations between two 
super powers would have enormous global influence:  
The two nations have cooperated with each other closely in the fields of combating terrorism 
and piracy, responding to climate change, and international peacekeeping, etc. The two 
countries have played great roles in promoting global economic recovery, reaching 
agreement on the nuclear issue of Iran, fighting the Ebola epidemic and promoting the peace 
process in Afghanistan, among others. Presently, China and the United States are both 
standing at a historical point, faced with opportunities and challenges. Therefore, it is 
inevitable for the two countries to hold different points of view and to have differences 
between them. Yet, their common interests outweigh by far their differences, and cooperation 
is the mainstream in the bilateral relations. (Wan, 2015).  
     Secondly, it was highlighted the profound friendship between the U.S. and China also accounts 
for the warm hospitality President Xi received in the U.S.:  
China has a long history of friendship with the United States. In 1971, the visit of U.S. table 
tennis team had opened a new chapter of U.S.-China relations. Since the reform and open 
policy, China had begun to interact and committed closer engagement with America. At 
present, the two countries have formed a 43 friend provinces/states and 200 sister cities ties. 
The number of people traveled between two countries last year were more than 4.3 million. 
Currently, China has opened more than 100 Confucius institutes in the United States. Also, 
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there are thousands of primary and middle school students in U.S. learning Mandarin at 
present. (Wang & Yuan, 2015).   
     Since the Chinese government has been criticized for not taking sufficient responsibility in 
international affairs, another recurring theme under the recognition frame was the emphasis that 
China has committed considerable effort to United Nations’ work. By illustrating specific 
statistics, this script was able to convey the message that China already shouldered responsibility 
in various ways, which was consistent with its economic strength and position:  
Over the past 60 years, China has provided nearly 400 billion yuan in assistance to 166 
countries and international organizations, forgiven inter-governmental interest-free loans 
owed by heavily-indebted poor countries seven times, and given medical support to 69 
countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and Oceania. (L , 2015).  
     Aside from referring to the contributions of the past, this script devoted a large amount of 
attention to the promise that President Xi made in his U.N. speech to construct the image of a 
responsible world power:  
President Xi pledged an initial $2 billion investment in developing countries, and to step up 
investment in the least developed countries - mostly in Africa - to reach $12 billion by 2030. 
While it was warmly welcomed by leaders of the developing states at the meeting, this 
Chinese offer, plus the earlier $3.1 billion offer to help developing countries in fighting 
climate change, also did much to defuse a muffled discontent among the developed countries 
headed by the US that China was not doing enough for the developing world, beyond just 
rhetoric. (Li, 2015).  
     Surprisingly, two New York Times articles fall under this frame. One addressed President Xi’s 
remarks in the U.N. speech and the other emphasized the courteous reception the President 
received at the state dinner:  
In a reflection of just how important Washington’s relationship with Beijing has become, 
President Obama on Friday held his second state dinner for China, the only country to 
receive such a double honor from him. (Harris, 2015).  
 
Great-leader Frame      
     The second major frame in the P ople’s Daily coverage is the great-leader frame. Nearly 24 
stories (22 percent) in People’s Daily suggested that President Xi is an admirable leader with vision 
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and competence. This theme essentially deals with the remarkable achievement President Xi had 
attained as a result of the trip and with the image of President Xi as an approachable leader who 
was immensely popular with the masses. The key word “ 果” (achievement) appeared in the 
People’s Daily reports 105 times, while “共识” (consensus) was used 70 times. Overall, this frame 
painted an optimistic portrait of President Xi, with excellent diplomatic skills and an attitude of 
cherishing the people. The accomplishment President Xi achieved during his visit to the U.S., on 
various issues, was a recurring topic in the People’s Daily coverage. For example, it was mentioned 
that 49 results were achieved during the meeting: 
During Xi and his US counterpart Barack Obama's summit on Friday in the White House 
and a three-hour-long talk on ties in the Blair House on Thursday night, covering a wide 
range of issues regarding investment, people-to-people exchanges, climate change and 
coordination and cooperation in multilateral affairs. (Du, 2015).  
     In order to make those achievements more relatable to readers, People’s Daily also featured 
three stories that thoroughly analyzed how these results were reached between two presidents and 
how they would impact normal citizens’ lives on daily basis:  
During the visit, President Xi and President Obama held in-depth, candid, constructive 
conversations. The two sides reached broad consensus and achieved 49 important results, 
including the new type of international relations, the bilateral cooperation, the Asia-pacific 
regional affairs and global climate change. The following will tell you how these 
achievements will affect your life in several aspects. (Yuan & Fu, 2015).  
     The other prominent aspect of the great-leader frame is highlighting the genial and amicable 
attitude of President Xi when engaging with the masses. To add some historical perspective to the 
depiction of Xi as China’s populist leader, People’s Daily featured several stories on the 
experiences President Xi acquired when visiting the U.S. during the three years prior to his 
presidency. Such stories attempted to create the impression that President Xi is an everyman’, 
referring to ‘normal’ things that the average Chinese person could relate to: “watched the LA 
Lakers face off against the Phoenix Suns”, “Xi Jinping and Joe Biden ate chocolate in the 
meetings” and “New York's times square giant screen played welcome video on Xi Jinping's visit 
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to the United States”. Not only do these humanistic stories stress that President Xi is an 
experienced leader in diplomatic affairs, they also make him a real person rather than a government 
official who appeared highest on the social ladder. In addition, Chinese-Americans or Chinese 
people living in the U.S. were frequently quoted to comment on their experiences meeting with 
President Xi during the visit in order to underline President Xi’s popularity and charm:  
This morning I came to Seattle downtown at 6:30 am to welcome President Xi and the first 
lady. When I got there, there were already nine buses full of people waiting in the parking 
lot. People from various places waving the flag of China and the United States seemed like 
to attend a party. Even this morning was only 50 degrees Fahrenheit, but I felt deeply warm 
when I got together with those joyful compatriots to greet President, said by the Seattle 
residents Jiang Mingfei. (Han, 2015). 
 
Description Frame      
     The description frame is primarily concerned with coverage describing affairs related to 
President Xi’s state visit. Instead of presenting an in-depth analysis of the events that occurred 
during President Xi’s state visit, coverage pertaining to this frame typically tended to provide 
descriptive information regarding the trip. A total of 11 stories (17 percent) in The New York Times 
and 23 stories (20 percent) in People’s Daily can be categorized under the description frame. Both 
news outlets devoted considerable efforts to conveying facts related to the state visit without 
providing excessively subjective interpretations.  
     In the U.S. case, although stories did not explicitly criticize China or the Chinese government’s 
actions, some of the journalists did express negative feelings about China in a more implicit and 
indirect way by demonstrating specific matters:  
And while Pope Francis chose to break bread in Washington on Thursday with hundreds of 
homeless people, President Xi Jinping of China will be feasting on lamb and lobster at the 
White House on Friday night at a black-tie state dinner. The visits of the bishop of Rome and 
the Chinese president to the nation’s capital came only hours apart, but they could not have 
been more different. The pope came bearing a message of peace and help for the least 
privileged, while Mr. Xi’s trip was choreographed to maximize the image of China as a great 
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power worthy of respect and the highest measures of protocol from the leader of the free 
world. (Demczuk, 2015).   
     On the other hand, the People’s Daily articles belonging to the description frame were mainly 
concerned with the official statement of the Chinese government or supplementary stories related 
to the state visit, such as: “外交部：习 平 席访美是一次历史性访问” (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: the state visit of President Xi in U.S. is a historical one); “专家解读： 何习
平访美首站选择西雅 ” (Expert analysis: why President Xi chose Seattle as the first stop in his 
state visit); and “随习 平访美的 15位商界大佬有何背 ？” (What is the background of the 
15 entrepreneurs who participated in the visit along with President Xi in U.S.?). 
 
H1: Due to the large power distance China features – compared to the U.S. – in combination 
with its journalism unconditionally toeing the party’s dominant ideology, the general 
assessment of President Xi’s state visit should be dominantly positive in People’s Daily. 
Table 4. General assessment of President Xi’s first state visit - news coverage distribution 
The General Assessment The New York Times  People’s Daily 
Positive Count 
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     H1 predicted that the general assessment of Presidents Xi’s state visit would be different 
between Chinese and American newspapers because of the different ideologies, journalistic 
systems and power distance the two nations are characterized by. People’s Daily tended to make 
a relatively higher positive evaluation of the state visit, while Th New York Times tended to reflect 
a less positive evaluation of President Xi’s trip. 
     The findings of the research strongly support H1 according to Table 4, with almost half (53 
articles) of the Chinese newspaper articles using a positive tone to appraise the outcome President 
Xi achieved during his first state visit in the U.S. This figure was much higher than that of The 
New York Times, where only one article presented a positive evaluation of the trip. The positive 
tone was identified consistently in the P ople’s Daily reports during the sampling period. Before 
the state visit, the Chinese newspaper set high expectations for the President’s trip to the U.S., 
declaring it a major “historical”, “meaningful” and “milestone” event for Sino-U.S. relations. 
During and after the visit, the Chinese articles summarized the visit as “fruitful”; declared that 
President Xi and President Obama “reached broad consensus on the bilateral relations”; and 
reported that the two countries promised to “strengthen cooperation and jointly cope with 
challenges on various issues”. No Chinese articles were found to have a negative tone towards 
President Xi’s state visit, unlike 23 percent of the articles in The New York Times.  
Prior to the actual state visit, 6 articles in The New York Times repeatedly demonstrated that 
the U.S. side had no expectation that President Xi’s visit would have tangible results, employing 
negative rhetoric to emphasize the sharp conflict between two countries: “There is little chance, 
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he said, that the sharp differences will be resolved at the meeting between Mr. Xi and President 
Obama”; “Mr. Xi is expected to yield little on points of contention between the United States and 
China”; and “There is little expectation that Mr. Xi will promise anything as drastic as he did last 
year”. Instead of providing a general assessment for the whole trip, around half of the coverage 
from the Chinese and U.S. newspapers were focused on particular aspects of the trip. In addition, 
13 articles (20 percent) from The New York Times demonstrate a combined or balanced evaluation 
of President Xi’s trip, while only 7 articles (6 percent) from People’s Daily were found to be under 
the same category. 
 
RQ2: What issue of the state visit is the most salient in the coverage of The New York Times 
and People’s Daily? (i.e., military power, economy, environment, cyber security, human 
rights, education, general Sino-U.S. relations, other.) 
Table 5: Issue salience in President Xi’s first state visit to the U.S. - coverage in People’s Daily and The 
New York Times 
Issues (Count, 
% of total articles) 
The New York Times  People’s Daily 
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     The second research question sought to examine issue salience in the coverage of The New York 
Times and People’s Daily. The economy was the most prominent issue in both newspapers, which 
mainly discussed business, commerce and trade agreements between the two nations. However, 
the ways in which The New York Times and People’s Daily presented the same issue varied 
tremendously. In the U.S. case, discontent over the Chinese government’s extracted pledge of 
compliance from U.S. high tech companies was easily detected. Concerns were raised that the 
Chinese government was using its country’s vast market as leverage in order to force some 
American firms to commit o turning user data and intellectual property over to the government 
when required. In contrast, coverage addressing economic issues in P ople’s Daily primarily 
explained the importance of bilateral trade and financial corporation. It also suggested that China 
was appealing to international investment with the market under the CPP’s administration.  
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The second salient issue in The New York Times was cybersecurity at 19 percent of articles, 
which was presented in just 11 percent of coverage in P ople’s Daily. Similar to most other issues, 
the Chinese and American newspapers chose to highlight different aspects of the cybersecurity 
issue. The New York Times primarily condemned the cyber espionage that China had conducted in 
the U.S. and was suspicious of whether China would fulfill its pledge on cybersecurity. On the 
other hand, People’s Daily predominantly celebrated the agreement China had reached with U.S. 
to jointly fight cybercrimes, in which both countries “agreed to step up investigation assistance 
and information sharing on cybercrime cases”.  
The cybersecurity issue was closely followed by human rights issues, at 16 percent of articles 
in The New York Times and only 3 percent of articles in People’s Daily. The New York Times 
devoted considerable attention to constructing the depiction of China as an abuser of human rights, 
while People’s Daily applauded the progress China had achieved in women’s rights. Military 
power took fourth place in The New York Times articles, at 14 percent compared to 9 percent in 
People’s Daily. With regards to this issue, The New York Times explicitly criticized the aggressive 
island building the Chinese government had taken in the South China Sea, while the People’s 
Daily repeatedly underscored the concept of “China’s peaceful rise”, which stressed that, as a 
rising power, China would not violate the sovereignty of other nations. Environmental issues were 
discussed in 10 percent of articles in The New York Times and 7 percent of articles in People’s 
Daily. The former newspaper questioned the viability of China’s cap on the carbon dioxide 
emission plan while the latter primarily claimed that China and the U.S. would work together on 
climate change to benefit the world.  
Interestingly, the issue of general Sino-U.S. relations stressing a “joining of hands” between 
China and the U.S. gained considerable attention from People’s Daily at 24 percent, but just 4 
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percent in The New York Times. Regarding this topic, People’s Daily was concerned with the “new 
model of major –country relationship between U.S. and China”, which is a relationship “based on 
mutual respect and win-win cooperation”. Additionally, both newspapers published numerous 
articles pertaining to the “others” category, at 15 percent and 13 percent in The New York Times 
and People’s Daily, respectively. In the People’s Daily, 11 articles discussed the cooperation that 
China and U.S. had achieved in China’s anti-corruption action, whereas only a single American 
article mentioned this topic, and only briefly. The New York Times devoted more attention to the 
Pope’s visit to the U.S. and to the state dinner. The issue of education occupied 2 percent of 
coverage in The New York Times coverage and 8 percent in People’s Daily. Both newspapers 
discussed about the announcement of the “One Million Strong” plan, which aimed to have one 
million American students learning Mandarin by 2020. 
 
RQ3: What information sources do People’s Daily and The New York Times primarily cite? 
Table 6: Source frequencies on the President Xi’s first state - visit coverage of People’s Daily and The 
New York Times    
Sources 
(Count, % of total articles) 
The New York Times  People’s Daily 





















































     The third research question sought to discover the sources that People’s Daily and The New 
York Times quoted in their coverage of President Xi’s first state visit in the U.S. In both 
newspapers, all officials (i.e. including President Xi, President Obama, Chinese officials and U.S. 
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officials) were the major sources, with those sources appearing in 56.2 percent of P ople’s Daily 
articles and 58.9 percent of coverage inThe New York Times. However, if examining source 
distribution separately, there are observable differences between the two newspapers. Specifically, 
the most dominant source in People’s Daily coverage were President Xi (36.3 percent) followed 
by U.S. officials (13.3 percent). In The New York Times, however, the most frequently cited source 
was U.S. officials (22.3 percent) followed by President Obama (15.0 percent). It is worth noting 
that People’s Daily quoted more American officials (13.3%) than domestic officials (9.4 percent), 
whereas The New York Times used domestic official sources (23.3 percent) more often than 
Chinese official sources (11.4 percent). A similar pattern was also found in the source categories 
of Chinese citizens and U.S. citizens: People’s Daily cited U.S. citizens (7.4 percent) more often 
than Chinese citizen (0.8 percent) while The New York Times quoted Chinese citizens (10.3 
percent) at a higher frequency than U.S. citizens (3.4 percent). Both newspapers were more 
inclined to cite the comments of scholars from their own countries, with Chinese scholars and U.S. 
scholars cited in 9.4 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively, of coverage in People’s Daily. On the 
other hand, The New York Times cited Chinese scholars in 4.5 percent of articles and U.S. scholars 
in 10.5 percent of articles. The voices of entrepreneurs, including entrepreneurs from the U.S. and 
China, appeared less frequently, representing a combined 6.8 percent of coverage in People’s 
Daily and 2.2 percent in The New York Times. In addition, People’s Daily cited other foreign media 
more frequently, at a rate of 4.5 percent, while Th  New York Times cited other foreign media in 
just 0.2 percent of coverage. Finally, other resources occupied 11.4 percent of coverage in Peopl ’s 
Daily 9.9 percent of all quoted sources in The New York Times. 
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Discussion    
     This thesis conducted a quantitative content analysis and qualitative evaluation of news frames 
to examine the coverage of President Xi’s first state visit to the United States in People’s Daily 
and The New York Times. The aim of this research was to compare the different news frames 
employed by Chinese and American newspapers while noting political, ideological and cultural 
factors to explain corresponding frames. As the results from the previous section illustrated, both 
People’s Daily and The New York Times interpreted President Xi’s trip to the U.S. through the 
adoption of different frames, subjective evaluation, selection of issues and the choice of quoted 
sources. 
     Five dominant frames were articulated in the two newspaper. Th  New York Times successfully 
constructed an “anti-China” frame (with “aggressive military action”, “abuser of human rights” 
and “weak economic performance” scripts), the “provocateur” frame (with “autocrat deliberately 
confronting U.S.” and “harness nationalism” scripts) and the description frame. In contrast, the 
three distinct frames embedded in People’s Daily articles were the “recognition” frame 
(“welcoming attitude from the U.S. side” and “China as a responsible rising power”), the “great-
leader” frame (“productive trip in U.S.” and “populist leader”) and the description frame. Although 
both newspapers devoted some of their coverage the description frame, the two news discourses 
constructed completely different social realities for President Xi’s state visit - specifically, 
different images of the Chinese government and President Xi.  
     The general assessment of the trip found in People’s Daily was largely positive with no negative 
comments identified. In contrast, 43 percent of The New York Times articles gave a negative or 
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mixed evaluation of President Xi’s trip. The commonality that the two newspapers shared was that 
around half of each of their articles made no specific comment towards President Xi’s entire trip. 
     Thirdly, the most salient issue in People’s Daily was the economy (25 percent) followed by 
general Sino-U.S. relations (24 percent, other issues (13 percent) and cybersecurity (11 percent). 
In The New York Times, the most frequent topic was also the economy (22 percent), followed by 
the issue of cybersecurity (19 percent), human rights (16 percent) and military power (15 percent). 
     The fourth major finding of this research was concerned with the sources that People’s Daily 
and The New York Times quoted in their articles. Consistent with the results of previous studies, 
the results of the current study suggest that both news discourses were inclined to cite official 
sources more often than any other type of source. In fact, the overall category of officials (including 
President Xi, President Obama, Chinese officials and U.S. officials) appeared in 56.2 percent of 
People’s Daily articles and 58.9 percent of articles in The New York Times. However, People’s 
Daily quoted U.S. officials more frequently than domestic officials. Similarly, both newspapers 
were found to be more likely to cite foreign citizens than their domestic counterparts. Finally, 
American and Chinese entrepreneurs appeared infrequently in the chosen articles from both 
People’s Daily and The New York Times. 
 
General assessment and frames 
     The New York Times constructed an antagonistic image of President Xi and the Chinese 
government in various aspects, with coverage casting the Chinese President’s state visit under the 
overarching “anti-China” frame, which remained consistent throughout coverage of the whole trip. 
The framing device used by The New York Times depicted China in a negative light, suggesting 
that China was a problematic nation both internally and externally, that it behaved deceitfully, and 
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that it had to follow certain rules in order to earn respect from the international community. Firstly, 
coverage emphasized the incompetence of the Chinese government as evidenced by its handling 
of the slowing economy and unstable stock market. Secondly, the aggressive island building in the 
South China Sea area and the increasing cyberattack both contributed to the construction of an 
image of China as an “uncooperative”, “unamiable” and “threating” government. By providing 
stories related to the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement and recently arrested activists, The 
New York Times uccessfully reinforced the predisposed “human rights’ abuser” image it had built 
for the Chinese government. Although T e New York Times did have two stories that recognized 
China as a rising power, playing an important role in international affairs, neither of these articles 
constructed a positive image of the Chinese government via in-depth analysis. In terms of the 
depiction of President Xi, The New York Times was inclined to portray him as a “provocateur” 
who dared to go against U.S. will directly. The script of he “mysterious inner circle of President 
Xi” and “vigorously advocate nationalism” further reinforced the proposition of an “autocratic” 
communist leader.  
     The reports of The New York Times were evidently influenced by journalistic norms of the 
“China frame”, dominant ideology of anti-communism and elite ideology in the United States. As 
Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) assert, a “China frame” has persisted in U.S. newspaper 
coverage of China throughout the last several decades, in which journalists have attempted to 
highlight the failures and problems that the communist state has experienced while enforcing the 
image of China as a nation of “deceitful communists”. Although the anti-communist narrative had 
been suspended for years around the time of President Nixon’s visit to China, the Tiananmen 
Square student protest caused this frame to reemerge in American news coverage. This pre-
existing narrative of reporting about China with a negative skew could have impacted the manner 
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in which U.S. journalists wrote stories about President Xi’s trip, since they might utilize this 
standardized pattern or “shared reality” to guide their work, as suggested by Shoemaker and Reese 
(2014). Media practitioners need to learn how journalism is accomplished in an organization and 
how a similar story has been written in the past, especially when they enter the newsroom 
environment. The standardized “anti-communist” framing pattern that existed for decades may 
become the reference to guide the story, and previous studies (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 
1998; Wu, 2006; Duan & Takahashi 2016) confirmed this.  
In addition, the dominant ideology of capitalism and anti-communism helped shape the 
negative portrayal of the Chinese government and its president. In The New York Times, journalists 
explicitly claimed that China was “ideological adversary” to the U.S. in five different comments, 
stating that China’s aggressive action was extremely threatening to American national security. 
One article quoted a former Chinese Colonel to support the mutual adversaries’ statement: 
“Colonel Liu said, ‘Washington sees 1.3 billion people as enemies. Washington sees China as an 
adversary, and as a result that will push China to becom an enemy of the United States’”. (Wong, 
2015). In addition, some of the reports in The New York Times were inclined to associate China 
with other “ideological enemies” of the U.S., such as Russia and Iran, in order to stress the point 
that “China is not one of the U.S. alliances”. This point can be seen in the excerpt:  
But the escalating cyberconflict poses a particularly complex problem, because there is no 
equivalent of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for computer networks. That is exactly 
what makes the use of cybertechniques and weapons so attractive to the Russians, the 
Chinese, the Iranians and the North Koreans — and, to some extent, the United States. 
(Sanger, 2015).  
     As Chin-Chuan Lee (2003) claimed, “A nation has to construct ‘them’ to anchor ‘us’. 
Progressive voices at home can turn indifferent, intolerant or belligerent when it comes to foreign 
countries. The U.S. media habitually made what Herman and Chomsky (1988) called ‘worthy 
victims’ out of Communist abuser to highlight the superiority of capitalism democracy, while 
72 
playing down human rights atrocities committed by U.S. allies” (p.77). Furthermore, the elite 
ideology also prevailed as one the primary influences on the “anti-China” framing and the general 
assessment, and the attitude of the administration in power towards China clearly demonstrated 
their negative feeling about the Chinese government and President Xi:  
One of the Republican contenders in the 2016 presidential election, Gov. Scott Walker of 
Wisconsin, urged Mr. Obama in August to withdraw the invitation to Mr. Xi and to “focus 
on holding China accountable over its increasing attempts to undermine U.S. interests.” His 
rival for the nomination, Donald J. Trump, has led the charge against China, taking to 
television and Twitter to disseminate harsh words about China’s economy: Because China’s 
going bad it’s going to bring us down, too, because we’re so heavily coupled with China,” 
he recently told Fox News. He has also said he would offer Mr. Xi a McDonald’s hamburger 
rather than a state dinner. (Perlez, 2015).  
     Additionally, the value of favoring conflict in U.S. journalism was also obvious in the 
quantitative results of the study (Table 4), with a total of 43 percent of articles mentioning that 
confrontation and controversy occurred during President Xi’s trip. At the same time, the 
journalistic values of “objectivity” and “balance” were reflected in the general assessment of 
President Xi’s state visit, in which 56 percent of articles gave no specific evaluation of the whole 
trip (Table 4). Moreover, the small power distance that American society features nd journalists’ 
perceived role as “fourth estate” may also account for the neutral and slightly negative assessment 
of President Xi. Because of the relatively small power distance that exists between journalists (less 
powerful members of the society) and political leaders, it is easier – and makes sense - for 
journalists in the U.S. to critically comment on foreign governments’ policies and actions. 
     People’s Daily, on the other hand, presented an efficient and respectful picture of President Xi 
and the Chinese government in its news coverage. Instead of focusing on providing a negative 
depiction of the other country, the reports in People’s Daily paid more attention to the results that 
the Chinese government had achieved in diplomacy, the economy and politics in the international 
arena. The “recognition” frame served to build a supportive image of the Chinese government in 
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dealing with diplomatic issues. Through this frame, the Chinese government was portrayed as 
being welcomed by the Obama administration, being committed to caring for its people and people 
from other nations, and being confident in its promises and actions. People’s Daily positioned 
China as an important nation at the center of global attention. Its framing device presented China 
as a rising country, actively participating in multilateral affairs, with its standing deserving of 
recognition by other nations. The sense of national pride is obvious in the People’s Daily articles, 
in which China was promoted as becoming a major world power. With President Xi’s visit, the 
U.S. and international community showed its respect to China, suggesting that China as worthy of 
equal status with the United States. Although there were different opinions between the U.S. and 
China on various issues, People’s Daily devoted a large amount of coverage to conveying the 
message that China was open-minded about cooperating with the United States and benefiting the 
international community, rather than driven to engage in conflict and confrontations. In terms of 
the portrayal of President Xi, People’s Daily was dedicated to praising the achievements President 
Xi had made in his trip and featured several stories to build the image of a “populist and 
approachable leader” image. The discourse analysis of the frames supported the view that the 
People’s Daily’s reports on President Xi’s state visit were mostly along the party line and 
legitimatized the authority of the party, which was significantly influenced by journalistic culture, 
ideology and the large power distance within in Chinese society.  
    As Chin-Chun Lee (2003) stated, China became eager to raise its reputation and discursive 
power in the new world older once its communist government embraced global capitalism. From 
Beijing’s perspective, the growth of China’s economic and military power should earn the 
international recognition it deserves. China’s ambitious membership to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games was portrayed in the Chinese media 
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as discourse that demonstrated China passing the threshold into the elite power club (Chin-Chuan 
Lee, 2003). Consistent with Chin-Chuan Lee’s result, this study also found that the coverage of 
President Xi’s state visit in U.S from People’s Daily profusely hailed the achievements and 
attention President Xi had gained from the U.S. side and the rest of the world, clearly illustrating 
China’s genuine eagerness to elevate its international status. The People’s Daily reports were a 
result of mixed elements in the process of framing, especially the dominant ideology the Chinese 
government has ceaselessly advocated in the increasingly globalized world: nationalism. Chin-
Chuan (2003) concluded that communism, as a grand ideology, had gradually diminished as a 
belief system in China, because the economic reforms implemented during the late 1970s had 
altered substantial principles of communism (“class struggle”, “egalitarianism”, “proletarian 
dictatorship” and “public ownership of property”). This made the remaining aspects of communist 
ideology in China the hierarchy of social class and discursive convention originating from the 
ideology (He, 2003).  
In order to remain in power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) introduced “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” to justify communism and its legitimacy in China. With the demise of 
communism in China, nationalism emerged as an alternative ideology to replace communism and 
had been covertly encouraged by the CCP since the early 1990s. He (2003) considered the 
definition of nationalism:  
To most citizens of China, nationalism is a combination of national pride, economic power, 
culture supremacy, xenophobia and even revenge. As the children of the Culture Revolution 
and the reform era come into power and money, observes Barme (1996:207), they are 
‘resentful of the real and imagined slights that their nation has suffered in the past, and their 
desire for strength and revenge is increasingly reflected in contemporary Chinese Culture. 
(p.200).   
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     Therefore, it was reasonable to witness coverage of the People’s Daily to depict President Xi’s 
state visit as a celebration of the CCP’s regime legitimation and international status China had 
earned in the new world order. 
     Secondly, the supportive depiction of President Xi and the Chinese government found in 
People’s Daily was highly related to the long-term state-press relations the Chinese government 
had built with the media. When the CCP took over power in 1949, the role Chinese journalists 
were supposed to serve was defined as propaganda cadres of the communist party-state (Cheek, 
1997). Although the commercialization and privatization policies executed since the late 1970s 
did loosen state-press tensions to some extent, the bottom line for most journalists in China was 
still to report along the party line. In Hanitzsch’s (2011) study, journalists’ perceived role as 
advocators and partners of government policy prevailed among Chinese journalists, with 56 
percent in the professional milieus. As the official newspaper of the CCP, People’s Daily 
inevitably served as “mouthpiece” of the CCP in its published articles. In the case of media 
coverage regarding President Xi’s state visit, the People’s Daily report was consistent with 
previous studies (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998; Wu, 2006; Hook & Pu, 2010), following 
the pro-government tradition. For example, it devoted the majority of its coverage to the 
achievements China has made in the economic and diplomatic spheres, to the promise and effort 
the Chinese government had made to benefit the world, and to the positive comments of external 
sources regarding the Chinese government’s performance and President Xi. 
     Thirdly, the People’s Daily report was influenced by the relatively large power distance in 
China. According to Hofstede (2010), China scored 80 while the U.S. scored 40 on this cultural 
dimension. The relatively high score on power distance means that the subordinate-superior 
(media-state) relationship tends to be polarized, which partially explains why the mission of 
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promoting the CCP’s interests, policies and ideology still remained steadfast among Chinese media 
organizations. Additionally, sitting in the higher rankings of power distance also demonstrates that 
people hold a generally optimistic attitude towards leaders’ capabilities and initiative (Hofstede, 
2010). In the case of coverage of President Xi’s state visit, People’s Daily devoted 22 percent of 
articles to portraying President Xi as well-rounded political leader and cited external sources as 
evidence, such as:  
The former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said to the reporter he had talked with Xi 
Jinping several time. He thought President Xi is a decisive man with rich experience and is 
one of the most outstanding Chinese leaders. (Wen & Li, 2015).  
     In terms of the general assessment, almost half of the articles made confirmedly positive 
comments on President Xi’s trip, which revealed the general attitude of support from Chinese 
journalists.  
 
Issue salience and sources 
     The content analysis results showed that People’s Daily and The New York Times attached 
different priorities to various issues involved in President Xi’s trip. The three most frequently 
discussed issues in The New York Times were the economy (22 percent), cybersecurity (19 percent) 
and human rights (16 percent). The emphasis on the issues of the economy and human rights in 
The New York Times might be a reflection of the twin pillars of United States: democracy and 
capitalism. As Chin-Chuan (2003) suggests, these two values are substantial concepts embedded 
deeply into American society. Therefore, when there are issues with trade (capitalism) and human 
rights (democracy), these issues are more likely to appear in U.S. journalistic discourses.  Coverage 
of The New York Times regarding the economy largely condemned the tight control of Chinese 
government rather than focusing on a specific trade agreement. It seemed that The New York Times 
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usually confused the boundary between politics and economics, criticizing the Chinese 
government for constructively engaging with American firms:  
China’s Internet czar, Lu Wei, is holding an Internet forum on Wednesday that many of the 
top American technology companies — such as Apple, IBM and Uber — are expected to 
attend. The meetings have rankled the Obama administration because the gatherings show 
that China has sway with American business leaders, even though China’s policies do not 
align with Washington’s. (Issac, 2015).  
     In terms of human rights, U.S. elite media discourse on this topic has consistently demonstrated 
its “ethnocentrism” and perceived itself as a guardian of democracy. Coverage of The New York 
Times addressing human right issues focused on the condemnation of suppression of dissidents, 
the continued surveillance of activists and their families, and the persecution of journalists who do 
not toe the CPC’s line. The New York Times illustrated that the U.S. is “exceptional” in democracy 
by constructing the presidential summit as President Xi coming to receive a lesson on human rights 
from President Obama. 
     In the coverage of People’s Daily, the three most salient issues were the economy (25%), 
general Sino-U.S. relations (24 percent) and other issues (13 percent). The attention paid to these 
three issues is believed to be mainly due to the dominant ideology, the elite ideology, and party-
press relations in China. Firstly, the dominant ideology (nationalism) has been not overtly 
advocated by the CPC for a number of years. Nationalism can be understood as the mentality that 
one’s country has become stronger than ever before and that they should be proud of it. Therefore, 
China’s economic growth turned out to be one of the most tangible results to go along with 
nationalism. The People’s Daily coverage often utilized statistics to encourage readers feel a sense 
of national pride:  
China’s investment in the United States has reached the highest on record in almost all 50 
states and covered many fields such as food, real estate, television, and energy. The data 
from U.S. department of commerce also showed that China’s investment in 2014 reached 
$9.5 billion, which has a significant growth compared with 3.3 billion in 2010. (Wan, 2015).  
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     In addition, the intensive party-press relations and elite ideology are reflected in the People’s 
Daily’s reports on President Xi’s trip, as it gave considerable coverage to Sino-U.S. relations - 
especially the “new type of great power relations”, which is an abstract concept President Xi has 
vigorously elaborated since he took power in 2012. According to Zeng (2016), President Xi called 
for a “new type of great power relations” when he met President Obama in 2012, which “represents 
a high-profile Chinese initiative to avoid confrontation between the rising power and the existing 
hegemony” (p.423). The more China emerged as a rising power, the more its conflict with the 
United States was likely to intensify. In order avoid repeating the tragedy of great power politics, 
the concept of a “new type of great power relations” was advocated by the CPC and interpreted as 
an essential part of President Xi’s “big country” diplomacy, with Chinese characteristics. 
However, no articles in The New York Times mentioned this concept. This may confirm Zeng 
(2016)’s conclusion that “From the strategic perspective, once the United States accepts this 
concept, it also recognizes China’s status as a ‘great power’, and thus, China will win the 
commensurate strategic space. In addition, it will be seen as the victory of Chinese diplomacy 
under Xi’s leadership” (p.431).  
Furthermore, promoting party leaders’ political agenda can also be detected in the coverage 
of People’s Daily on “anti-corruption” issues, coded as “other issues” in this study. Since President 
Xi became the general secretary of the CCP in November 2012, his robust anti-corruption 
campaign has been a significant part of his grand policy. More than 90 officials at and above the 
vice-ministerial level have been investigated by prosecutors over the past five years, according to 
a statement made by the Supreme People's Procuratorate in 2016 (Xinhua, 2016). Reports from 
People’s Daily concerning “anti-corruption” mainly emphasize China’s close cooperation with the 
U.S. in fighting corruption and tracking down fugitives.  
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     In terms of quoted sources, both newspapers relied heavily on governmental sources for 
information and were dedicated to conveying the government’s diplomatic policies. In The New 
York Times, U.S. official (22.3 percent) were the most prominent source. Statements from 
President Obama accounted for 15 percent of total quoted sources in the sample population of 
news articles, followed by Chinese officials at 11.4 percent. O e possible reason for the lion’s 
share of official sources might be the routinized practices of beat reporting. On the other hand, 
People’s Daily turned to President Xi for 36.3 percent of quotations, followed by U.S. officials 
(13.3 percent). President Xi’s dominant presence in People’s Daily coverage can be explained by 
the party-press relationship, in which the media is supposed to accurately and effectively 
communicate a party’s political policy and message. An interesting finding was that People’s 
Daily was more likely to quote American officials (12.3 percent) over domestic officials (9.4 
percent). A similar pattern was also found in the source categories of Chinese citizens and U.S. 
citizens, in which People’s Daily cited U.S. citizen more often than Chinese citizens, at 7.4 percent 
and 0.8 percent, respectively. This pattern could possibly be due to readers’ belief that statements 
made by both foreign and domestic sources are more reliable than those made solely by domestic 
sources. In addition, the voice of scholars took relatively significant share in both newspapers. 
Most of the sources were either international relations professors from elite universities or senior 
analysts from research institutions, mainly serving the role as “chief interpreters and secondary 
definers of the issue, inflecting and translating the official line for newspaper readers” (Zhao, 2003, 
p. 42). Finally, People’s Daily cited 29 other foreign media sources, including the BBC, The 
Guardian and Agence France-Presse. Almost all of these sources were utilized to share positive 
commentary regarding President Xi’s state visit and to celebrate the contribution China had made 
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to the international community, which served as the evidence of the nation’s rising international 
status and recognition.  
 
Conclusion 
     In conclusion, this study conducted content analysis to compare coverage of President Xi’s first 
state visit to the U.S. from articles published in People’s Daily and The New York Times. The 
findings indicated that newspapers from different nations attach different interpretations to the 
same event. In both newspapers, the Chinese government and President Xi were constructed as the 
major actors across the entire sampling period, but they were depicted from completely different 
perspectives. In The New York Times articles, the Chinese government was described as 
incompetent and dishonest in handling its slowing economy and unstable stock market. The 
depiction of the Chinese government as human rights “abuser” was promoted consistently during 
coverage of the entire trip. China’s aggressive military action in the South China Sea and 
cyberspace issues was interpreted as a huge threat to U.S. national security. The portrayal of 
President Xi primarily emphasized the direct threat he posed to U.S. interests and on his “greedy” 
gathering of power in China. Unlike the consistently negative anti-China frame used by The New 
York Times, People’s Daily framed a positive and pro-government image in its coverage of 
President Xi’s trip. Discourse in People’s Daily largely celebrated economic growth, diplomatic 
results and the international recognition China had achieved under the CCP’s leadership. It 
attempted to describe President Xi as a great leader who is approachable and beloved. The New 
York Times was mostly affected by the dominant ideology of “anti-communism” and predisposed 
“China frame” in the elite press. However, People’s Daily served the role as party publicity firm 
and was therefore deeply influenced by press-state relations, increasing nationalism and the large 
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power distance that Chinese society features. While both newspapers included economic issues 
among the top three most prominent issues covered, cybersecurity and human rights issues were 
highlighted most by The New York Times and anti-corruption and general Sino-U.S. relations by 
People’s Daily.  
     The priority attached to different issues is believed to be largely due to ideology. In the U.S., 
China is considered an ideological adversary. Therefore, it is important to criticize the “soft spot” 
of the Chinese government in order to contain it as a rising power. On the other hand, China is 
seeking to gain more discursive power to go alongside its unprecedented economy growth. Hence, 
the People’s Daily articles primarily focused on China’s success in the economic and political 
realms. It avoided contradictions and conflicts that China, as a rising power, had with the existing 
hegemony of the U.S. and did not engage in building any antagonistic images of the U.S. 
government. In terms of the distribution of quoted sources, both newspapers cited official sources 
more frequently than other sources, which might be due to journalistic routines embedded in media 
organizations. As Shoemaker and Reese (2014) suggested, news coverage is heavily influenced by 
various social forces. Since such differences exist between U.S and Chinese ideology, political 
policies and journalistic culture, it is unsurprising to observe that journalists in each country made 
different interpretations regarding the same media event.   
     The coverage of both newspapers regarding President Xi’s trip essentially reflected their 
governments’ perspectives, which suggests that the process of framing is rooted deeply in the given 
government regime type and the power relations that exist between the media and the government. 
The important lesson to be drawn from this study, for journalism education purposes, is related to 
the practice of news framing. Based on the results presented in this paper, it can be seen that 
freedom from government intervention does not guarantee that journalists produce truthful, 
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objective and fair news stories. Unlike People’s Daily, The New York Times not only enjoys 
freedom of expression as protected by the Constitution, but also operates independently from the 
state. However, its reports mainly convey government positions and policy preferences, which 
possibly reinforces public distrust in China. Due to intense press-state relations and increasing 
nationalism, coverage in People’s Daily primarily cheered for the accomplishments the Chinese 
government had attained.  
     Journalists and journalism educators should therefore pay more attention to the influence of 
national ideology, elite opinion and journalistic culture in covering foreign news and controversial 
issues. This is particularly important when journalists are covering an event that involves their 
home country and a potential competing nation, and when there are cultural, ideological and 
political conflicts between their homeland and their “adversaries”, since objectivity and fairness 
are more difficult to achieve under such conditions. One thing journalists could do is to focus on 
obtaining facts - especially facts that are not provided by their own government or parties. As Jiang 
and Hao (2010) suggested, “When there is conflicting information about facts which is most likely 
to happen in the context of international conflicts, cross-checking and further investigation are 
always required. When conflicting information cannot be verified, journalists should present 
stories from both sides and highlight their differences, in order to not only help the audience make 
a better judgment but also to put on record the differences for future verification” (p.266). By 
presenting information from both sides, journalists could not only better understand how the other 
side perceived and interpreted the same event, they could also report the other side’s opinion more 
accurately. 
As for the future American news coverage of the Chinese government, in my opinion the anti-
China frame would persist for a long time, in which China is treated as a major enemy nation to 
83 
compete with the U.S. As stated by Hook and Pu (2010): “the deep-seated, culturally bound 
cleavages reflected in both countries’ news coverage may aggravate rather than mitigate the 
solution of diplomatic ruptures” (p.179). Especially under the new Trump’s administration, who 
have repeatedly expressed his criticism towards China on various occasions. He recently twitted 
how he talked with Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, which break American diplomatic practices 
and gave Beijing a wakeup call that the fragile Sino-American relations might get even worse. On 
the other hand, the recognition and great-leader frame would be reinforced in China’s media 
discourse to go along with the prevailing ideology- nationalism. The Chinese government would 
continue to construct grand narratives to legitimate its authority and obtain confidence relying on 
China’s material power. The Chinese Communist Party would make sure media correctly 
disseminate the message that only under theirs rule Chinese citizens’ standard of living would be 
improved and only them would be able to maintain a stable and unified society. Also, Beijing may 
see Trump’s isolationism diplomatic policy as an opportunity for China’s rise, since his policy 
orientation would withdraw the U.S. influence in Asia or even around the globe. 
 
Limitations  
     It should be noted that this study has several limitations. Firstly, the analysis was limited to one 
form of elite press in China and one in the U.S., which may not be representative enough of all 
news outlets in each of the countries. Other market-oriented, mainstream and tabloid newspapers 
in China and U.S., and the image they built of President Xi’s state visit might differ from the results 
of this study. Secondly, this thesis only examined the text content of news stories and excluded the 
visual part. However, the visual images used in these reports may convey information that cannot 
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be explained through words. The exclusion of pictures for analysis might have affected the findings 
of the study. 
 
Future Studies  
      To further explore how ideology, politics and culture could potentially influence the framing 
process regarding President Xi’s state visit, a survey could be conducted among journalists and 
editors who covered this media event. Conducting surveys with the journalists who actually 
participated in the news-making process would help scholars better understand how ideology, 
culture and politics are intertwined in news framing and how journalists perceive these forces. For 
example, journalists could answer questions like, “To what extent were you influenced by anti-
communist ideology when you wrote the story about President Xi’s trip to the U.S.?” Additionally, 
future studies could analyze different types of media to examine how these media types framed 
the state visit. By including more types of media, research samples could be more representative 
and produce more reliable results. Finally, future studies could examine the effect of different 
media frames – for example, whether public opinion towards President Xi and the Chinese 
government was influenced by the coverage of People’s Daily, and whether the reader feels that 
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Major events for Sino-U.S. relations 
Source: China Daily 
A Cold War icebreaker by two former opponents leads to growing contact to solve thorny issues, 
and in a new century, efforts to forge a new type of major-power relationship 
July 1971: 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger makes a secret trip to China. 
February 1972: 
President Richard Nixon spends eight days in China, meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong and 
signing the Shanghai Communiqué with Premier Zhou Enlai. 
Jan. 1, 1979: 
China and the US mutually grant full diplomatic recognition. 
January 1979: 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping visits Washington D.C. and initiates a series of high-level 
exchanges, which result in many bilateral agreements in the areas of science, technology, cultural 
exchange and trade. 
August 1982: 
China and the US publish the August 17 Communiqué, in which both sides reaffirm the 
statements made about the Taiwan question. 
April 1984: 
President Ronald Reagan pays a six-day official visit to China, becoming the first US president 




Chinese President Li Xiannian pays an official visit to the US, the first by a Chinese head of 
state. 
February 1989: 
President George Bush pays a two-day visit to China. 
Oct. 26-Nov. 3, 1997: 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits the US and the two sides decide to implement the 1985 
agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. 
June 1998: 
President Bill Clinton visits China, during which he travels extensively and has direct interaction 
with the Chinese people. 
October 2000: 
President Clinton signs the US-China Relations Act, granting Beijing permanent normal trade 
relations with the US and paving the way for China to join the World Trade Organization. 
October 2001: 
President Jiang meets with President George W. Bush for the first time in Shanghai on the 
sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. The countries reach consensus on 
developing bilateral relations and anti-terrorism cooperation. 
October 2002: 
President Jiang again meets with President Bush at his Texas ranch, marking their third meeting 
in a year. 
December 2003: 
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Premier Wen Jiabao visits New York, Boston, and Washington, D.C. and has extensive 
interaction with American citizens. 
November 2005: 
President Bush pays an official visit to China, and the two countries reaffirm their intention to 
promote a constructive and cooperative relationship in the 21st century. 
April 2006: 
President Hu Jintao pays a state visit to the US and delivers a key speech on Sino-American ties. 
November 2008: 
President Hu visits the US at the invitation of President Bush to attend the G20 leaders' summit 
in Washington D.C. 
June 2009: 
The two countries hold the first China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington D.C. 
November 2009: 
President Barack Obama pays a state visit to China. 
January 2011: 
President Hu pays a state visit to the US 
February 2012: 
Vice-President Xi Jinping pays a five-day official visit to the US 
June 2013: 
Xi Jinping, now president of China, meets with President Obama for two days in Annenberg 
Retreat, California, in an effort to build a new type of major power relationship. 
November 2014: 
102 
President Obama visits Beijing and meets with President Xi. The two countries agree to mutually 
issue 10-year multiple-entry visas for business travelers and tourists, and 5-year multiple-entry 
visas for students. 
June 2015: 
Fan changlong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, visits the US and meets with 







President Xi’s state visit itinerary 
     Sept. 22: President Xi landed in Seattle, where he was welcomed by a delegation that 
included the former Washington governors Christine Gregoire and Former US ambassador to 
China Gary Locke. 
      At the dinner sponsored by the National Committee on United States-China Relations and the 
U.S.-China Business Council, President Xi delivered a major policy speech for representatives of 
business leaders and other dignitaries. 
     Sept. 23: President Xi participated in a round-table discussion with chief executives 
sponsored by Henry M. Paulson Jr., chairman of the Paulson Institute at the University of 
Chicago and a former Treasury secretary. He also visited Boeing’s factory in Everett, 
Washington, the largest production site for commercial aircraft, since China is an important 
client of Boeing. After that President Xi went to Lincoln High School in Tacoma and had cordial 
exchanges with school faculties and students, which he visited in 1993, when he was an official 
in Fuzhou in Fujian Province.  
     President Xi attended the U.S.-China Internet Industry Forum, hosted by Microsoft and the 
Internet Society of China, with Lu Wei, the Chinese official in charge of Internet policy, and 
guests who could include Robin Li of Baidu, Jack Ma of Alibaba, and executives from Apple, 
Facebook, Google, IBM and Uber. 
     Sept. 24: President Xi flew to Washington D.C., where he had a working dinner at the White 
House with President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and U.S. national security adviser 
Susan E. Rice. 
104 
     Sept. 25: President Xi was greeted with a 21-gun salute at the White House and held a joint 
news conference with President Obama. Then he attended the lunch at the State Department 
hosted by Mr. Kerry and Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. This was followed by a visit to 
Capitol Hill to meet with congressional leaders and a state dinner at the White House in the 
evening. 
     Sept. 26: President Xi proceeded to New York for events at the United Nations headquarters. 
     Sept. 27: President Xi was scheduled to make opening remarks and to serve as chairman of 
the first session in the Global Leaders’ Meeting on General Equality and Women’s 
Empowerment: A Commitment to Action, which was jointly held by China and United Nations. 
     Sept. 28: President Xi delivered a speech at t e United Nations’ 70th anniversary session. 
This was his first speech at the United Nations and underscored China’s status as a charter 
member, a co-founder of the postwar international order and a permanent member of the 
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Issue salience: This refers to the issues discussed in the articles. Each article maybe discussed 
more than one issue and each issue may be discussed more than once.  
 
The general assessment of President Xi’s state visit: the coder will locate content that provided 
the general assessment of president Xi’s state visit. Based on its inherent meaning and rhetoric 
description of the visit can be categorized into three categories: (1) a successful trip (i.e., 
President Xi’s visit to U.S. is a major success); (2) not an effective visit (i.e., Mr. Xi has in many 
ways confounded Mr. Obama’s hopes and expectations); (3) combination of achievement and 
conflicts in the state visit. 
 
Source of quotations: In this study, the type of information source is defined as a person or an 
interest group whose words are directly quoted by reporters. That can be indicated by attributions 
such as “he said,” “she argued,” or as so-and-so put it. The sources includes nine groups: 
(1)President Xi ; (2)President Obama ; (3)Chinese official ( i.e., President Xi’s entourage ); 
(4)U.S. official (i.e., the members of the Congress (senators and representatives), and federal, 
state, and/or local government officials.); (5)scholars(i.e., university professors or government 
organizations’ researchers  who study Sino-U.S. relations and international relations);(6)other 
foreign media (i.e., the Guardian, BBC News); (7) Ordinary Chinese citizen; (8)Ordinary 
American citizens; (9) Chinese entrepreneur (10)American entrepreneur (11) others (this 
category includes sources that cannot be categorized by any of the above-mentioned categories). 
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